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This thesis uses ecofeminist and human-animal studies lenses to explore human animal 
and nonhuman animal relations in early America. Most ecocritical studies of American literature 
begin with nineteenth-century writers. This project, however, suggests that drawing on 
ecofeminist theories with a human-animal studies approach sheds light on eighteenth-century 
texts as well. Early American naturalist travel writing offers a site replete with human and 
nonhuman encounters. Specifically, naturalist William Bartram’s travel journal features 
interactions with animals in the southern colonial American frontier. Amateur naturalist 
Elizabeth House Trist’s travel diary includes interactions with frontier and domestic animals. 
Sarah Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories, a conduct manual that taught children acceptable behavior 
towards animals, provides insight about the social regulation of human and nonhuman 
relationships during the late eighteenth century, when Bartram and Trist wrote their texts.  
This thesis identifies and analyzes textual sites that blur the human subject/and animal 
object distinction and raise questions about the representation of animals as objects. This project 
focuses on the subtle discursive subversions of early Euroamerican naturalist science present in 
Bartram’s Travels (1791) and the blurring of human/animal boundaries in Trist’s Travel Diary 
(1783-84); Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories (1794) further complicates the Euroamerican 
discourse of animals as curiosities. These texts form part of a larger but overlooked discourse in 
early British America that anticipated more well-known and nonhuman-centric texts in the 
burgeoning early nineteenth-century American animal rights movement.  
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CHAPTER ONE: WHEN ECOFEMINIST THEORY AND HUMAN-
ANIMAL STUDIES MEET EARLY AMERICA 
 
 
Statement of Purpose 
 
This thesis uses ecofeminist and human-animal studies lenses to explore human animal and 
nonhuman animal relations in early Euroamerican travel writing and a British children’s conduct 
manual published in early America.
1
 Most ecocritical studies of American literature begin with 
nineteenth-century writers. However, this study of naturalist William Bartram’s travel journal, 
amateur naturalist Elizabeth House Trist’s travel diary, and Sarah Trimmer’s conduct manual 




Focusing on Trist’s and Bartram’s narration of human and nonhuman relationships, I 
demonstrate that ecofeminist theories in conjunction with a human-animal studies approach 
enable a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of early American human and 
nonhuman interactions. I use these lenses to better understand the subtle subversion of the 
discourses of curiosity in Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories (1794), and the blurring of the 
human/animal binary in Bartram’s Travels (1791) and Trist’s Travel Diary (1783-84).  
                                                 
1
 Although for the sake of space and ease of reading I use the words “human,” and “animal,” I do not endorse the 
idea that humans are separate from or superior to animals; I do acknowledge the importance of recognizing and 
respecting human and animal difference. I invoke the condition of humanimality (acknowledging that humans are 
animals and are kin to nonhuman animals) by using the terms “human animal” and “nonhuman animal.” Carrie 
Packwood Freeman stresses the importance of these terms because they acknowledge human and animal kinship and 
imply that humans are not superior to animals (11-15).  
2
 Scholars have used the term “animal studies” in the past to mean scholarship descendent from cultural studies that 
considers “the question of the animal,” or investigates the manner in which human and animal difference (or 
similarity) is constructed by culture (Wolfe 564-67). Carol Freeman and Elizabeth Leane, however, offer a more 
recent and encompassing definition of this field that implies the interdisciplinary nature of the field and scrutiny of 
human and nonhuman bonding, communication, and interaction (2-3). I use Freeman’s and Leane’s term “human-





A Productive Merger: Ecofeminism, Human-Animal Studies, and Early American Texts  
 
Scholars neglect to examine the human/animal binary in eighteenth-century 
Euroamerican texts. 
3
 I scrutinize the human/animal binary in these texts as a way to unpack the 
ecofeminist concerns and animal advocacy occurring in the narration. Seeing subjects in 
nonhuman nature leads to greater respect and understanding of those nonhumans; however, early 
American texts often portrayed animals as curious objects for amusement, objects for scientific 
study, or as natural resources. By looking at nonhuman subjectivity with an ecofeminist and 
human-animal studies lens we can see that Trimmer’s text advocates against seeing animals as 
objects of amusement, while Bartram’s text presents frontier animals as unique individuals with 
agency, and Trist’s text illustrates movement towards companion species bonding with an animal 
trained for labor. These examples show that early Euroamerican texts did counter dominant 
cultural discourses about animals even more so than the degree that the majority of American 
ecocritical studies might suggest. In fact, these examples from eighteenth-century American texts 
present nonhumans as subjects, a representation that blurs the human/animal binary, and can lead 
to animal advocacy. Although the first American branch of the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals was not founded until 1866, animal advocacy was present to some degree in 
early America, as this reading of Bartram, Trist, and Trimmer will reveal (SPCA International). 
Reflecting on moments where animals are viewed as subjects, we might ask why these 
                                                 
3
 The human/animal boundary is based on the concept that humans are not animals and may be used to justify a 
range of human practices with animals, including eating or abusing them (Carrie Packwood Freeman 11). The term 
human/animal binary refers to the same concept as human/animal boundary but also stresses the fact that the 
“animal” is reduced by this relationship and invokes Donna J. Haraway’s discussion of binaries that should be 
blurred or “confused” in order to end the reduction of the lesser part of the binary (Symians). I also use “human-
animal” to indicate an equal and interdependent relationship between humans and animals that the term 





alternative discourses from the past are still minority voices today. By noticing these moments 
we encounter a new paradigm from which to approach animals in early American nature writing, 
which scholars may use to identify early Euroamerican animal advocacy and use as a beginning 
from which to reimagine more sustainable and respectful models for interacting with animals in 
contemporary America. 
Finding ways to see nonhumans as fellow subjects and understanding how our nation 
succeeded or failed in this endeavor is integral to discovering ways to live sustainably today with 
nonhumans. Because nature is still viewed as an economic resource even in contemporary 
America, animals are likewise viewed with the colonial mindset that, according to Timothy 
Sweet, plagues how contemporary Americans relate to nature. Sweet and Daniel Philippon 
recently argued that ecocritical examinations of early American texts can be rich and productive. 
Sweet’s discussion of the American eco-economy locates in modern American life the 
persistence of our colonial mindset and its unsustainability (424-25). In response to Sweet, 
Philippon explains that the humanities—including studies of early American literature—are 
equally important to the ecocritical cause as the sciences. Philippon reasons that because human 
behaviors and beliefs are the root of damage to the environment, exposing and altering these 
damaging behaviors will improve the global environment (430-33). I agree that this theoretical 
angle can identify unsustainable early American attitudes and practices. Moreover, I extend 
Sweet’s and Philippon’s arguments to include ecofeminist theory and human-animal studies 
tenets.
 
Studying the manner in which these early Euroamerican texts countered the colonial 
Enlightenment mentality, which endorses and promulgates anthropocentric thought, provides a 





Discourses of curiosity, colonialism, and early Euroamerican natural science inform the 
representation of animals as objects in eighteenth-century Euroamerica. A “curious” person 
investigated, catalogued, and kept specimens of interesting plants and animals (or “curiosities”) 
for study in the pursuit of knowledge; this definition also implied that a British man was most 
adept to observe and collect this knowledge (Parrish 63-67). Early American naturalist gathering 
and cataloguing methods were based on British botanical models, which looked toward 
Enlightenment theory for the conception that animals are lesser beings (Lewis 68). Naturalist 
methods of observation encouraged the objectification of nonhumans by simplifying categories, 
descriptions, and behaviors of animals. Western thought has relied on hierarchical categories to 
understand human and animal relations, which precludes acknowledging kinship among species 
(Bell 164). For example, the Chain of Being theory called for ranking all beings in a hierarchy 
with no possibility of blurring distinctions between species or the order of the hierarchy. The 
Linnaean classification system and Linnaean drawing method also placed nonhumans in 
definitive categories and left little room for descriptions of behavior, habitat, or interaction with 
other species (Magee 151-52). While early American naturalist methods promoted the 
objectification of animals because of the link with Enlightenment thought, objectification also 
occurred because naturalist agendas were often directed by British and later American colonial 
imperatives, which included appropriating nonhuman nature for national economic or 
philosophical benefit. Early American naturalists who gathered specimens also participated in 
nation-building practices and used cataloging to appropriate the natural resources of the new 





One key ingredient in my approach to how early Euroamerican texts promote nonhumans 
as subjects instead of objects is the ecofeminist assumption that all living beings exist 
interdependently, thereby making each being equally important to the survival of all beings. The 
common mission of ecofeminists is to end the reduction of women and nature while learning to 
view all beings in nature as equally valuable (Gates 21). One set of shared beliefs underpins 
ecofeminist texts:  
[T]he necessity for social transformation by moving beyond power politics and an 
equivalent necessity for less ‘management’ of the land. . . . They also include an 
appreciation for the intrinsic value of everything in nature—a biocentric rather 
than an anthropocentric viewpoint; an end to dualisms like male/female, 
thought/action, and spiritual/natural; and a trust in process, not just product. 
(Gates 21)  
This project acknowledges that these dichotomies and hierarchies are deeply rooted in American 
culture, partially because of the influence of these colonial and Enlightenment discourses, and 
require a multi-disciplinary dismantling to dispel them. This project also unpacks the 
“naturalness” of what counts as “natural” in human and animal relations. That is, naturalist 
science entailed more than simply recording and classifying because to record and classify 
entails a system; I examine the system itself by looking at how animals are made visible as 
individual beings (or not) in the eyes of the observer. Trimmer’s conduct manual provides a basis 






That which we otherwise take for granted or as “natural” can also be analyzed 
productively through a human-animal studies lens. Human-animal studies discourses intervene in 
dominant cultural representations of animals, which draw on Enlightenment and Judeo-Christian 
thought. With the help of this framework I can “re-see” the relationships depicted in early British 
American texts that draw on naturalist and travel discourses. The Enlightenment period, 
(featuring philosophers such as Descartes and Kant) although brief, stands as “the formative one 
for our prevailing intellectual, political, and juridical institutions” (Wolfe 564). While post-
humanist thinkers acknowledge that the human/animal binary harms all beings by reducing 
animals and creating a false separation of humans and animals, the Enlightenment belief in this 
false divide remains pervasive in current ideology. In general, human-animal studies scholars 
argue against viewing animals as diminished, lesser, or incomplete humans; they also recognize 
animals as agents of their own free will who speak, communicate, and gain wisdom through 
bodily experiences (Freeman 24-29). A recurring objective throughout human-animal studies 
scholarship is to ponder “the question of the animal” in society and culture. More recently, the 
mission of this interdisciplinary field includes investigating human and animal relations, bonds, 
and interspecies communication (Freeman and Leane 2-3). In short, “a human-animal studies 
scholar reflects on, as well as describes, the ‘limitations and complexities’ of these relationships” 
(Ken Shapiro qtd. in Freeman and Leane 3). The territory of human-animal studies remains 
difficult to define because it reaches to any text that includes animals (Wolfe 565). Although 
eighteenth-century American human and animal relations, communication, and bonds exist 
within the broad purview of human-animal studies, these texts remain mostly unexplored. I 





and nonhumans communicate, and identify when interspecies bonding occurs. All of these 
actions can signal a movement away from seeing nonhumans as objects and towards viewing 
them as subjects with agency.  
In the selected texts in this thesis, I examine passages that narrate human recognition of 
animal suffering and death, a turn that anticipates sympathy and understanding of these animals 
as fellow subjects. In early Euroamerican colonial and naturalist texts, animals were usually 
presented as objects. According to twenty-first-century human-animal studies thinkers, 
objectifying nonhumans precludes sympathy and leads to harmful, unsustainable behavior 
towards all beings.
4
 Human lack of sympathy for animals relates to an inability to acknowledge 
their suffering and death for the benefit of humans. Some scholars believe the solution is for 
humans to exhibit a feminist ethics of care and re-learn sympathy for animals in order to 
recognize and stop horrific abuse of nonhumans (Donovan 294). Human-animal thinkers explain 
the distinct category of “human” as a harmful cultural fabrication because it opens the way for 
abuse; that is, the term “animal” itself may contradict the “humane” (The Sexual Politics of 
Meat, 168-71). In essence, ecofeminist and human-animal thinkers argue that the category of 
“animal” also implies objectification by humans. For Carol J. Adams, Josephine Donovan, and 
Victoria Johnson, this viewpoint damages humans and nonhumans by creating a relationship of 
power that also invites abuse.  
                                                 
4
 Twenty-first-century sympathy should not be confused with Adam Smith’s eighteenth-century notion of sympathy, 
which operates more like contemporary empathy; it entails a spectator imagining themselves in the position of 
another and determining if s/he would react to the situation with the same emotions. If the observer determines that 
s/he would share the emotions of the other person given their situation, then the observer sympathizes with the other 
person. Smith claims that, for humans, sharing mutual emotions (positive or negative) brings pleasure, intensifies 





Human-animal studies ultimately offers a lens to accomplish the main objective of this 
thesis: a framework through which to track the textual resistance to, complication of, and even 
dismantling of Euroamerican subjectivity defined by anthropocentricism and human and 
nonhuman interactions. Rather than adopt a humanist definition of subjectivity, I use Patrick D. 
Murphy’s anti-anthropocentric definition of subjectivity.
5
 Murphy defines subjectivity as the 
ability to respond to another being with any type of semiotic exchange, even if this exchange 
consists of “non-volitional utterances” or nonverbal engagement (“Subjects” 123-24). This 
definition is essential to this project because it allows viewing nonhuman communication, 
knowledge, and knowledge production as “speech,” which stands at the core of asserting agency, 
and therefore, signaling subjectivity. Also wary of a humanist practice of human-animal studies, 
I call upon Donna J. Haraway’s concept of companion species in order to interrogate hierarchical 
notions of human and animal relationships. A “companion species” relationship, as Haraway 
defines it, goes beyond a pet/owner or human/animal dichotomy because it features recognition 
of all the ways that human and nonhuman bodies and minds intertwine to make us human 
animals. This recognition then allows humans to see past the culturally constructed 
human/animal binary, which leads to viewing animals as kin, thereby increasing human respect 
for nonhumans and reducing abuse towards them (When Species Meet 16-19). This concept is 
vital to this project because it provides an example of an alternative to the human/animal 
hierarchy and aids in identifying moments in the selected texts that deviate from this eighteenth-
century cultural norm.  
                                                 
5
 As Cary Wolfe explains, the attempt to simply grant nonhumans human subjectivity comes from a humanist 





This project extends the work of ecocritical and ecofeminist scholars to track how animals 
emerge as non-anthropocentric speaking subjects in Trist’s and Bartram’s travel journals. These 
texts reveal a language of empathy and advocacy for nonhuman kin.
6
 Trimmer’s children’s 
conduct manual serves as a backdrop, advancing a dichotomous relationship that may best 
represent the views of general audiences. Adults of Bartram’s and Trist’s generation could likely 
have read or presented Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories to their children. Trimmer’s conduct 
manual inculcated lessons about a human/animal hierarchy even as it discouraged treating 
animals as curious objects.  
By viewing these three texts in conversation and through an ecofeminist/animal-centric 
paradigm modern readers can identify disruptions in dominant cultural narratives about humans 
and animals. If we attend to these moments of human and nonhuman connection and 
understanding, we observe that human/animal hierarchies are no more “natural” to the eighteenth 
century than they are today. Perhaps these moments from long ago can offer contemporary 
scholars a starting point for theorizing early British American naturalist texts as ecocritical and 
for developing more sustainable relationships with animals today. When readers and writers 
recognize animals as subjects, they begin moving away from colonial interactions with animals 
and toward acknowledgement of nonhuman animals as speaking subjects with their own diverse 
and unique identities. 
  
                                                 
6
 While eighteenth-century sympathy, to an extent, enables the animal advocacy in these texts, I plan to pursue this 





CHAPTER TWO: TEACHING CHILDREN ABOUT “PROPER” 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH NONHUMANS 
 
 
British Colonial and Early American Conduct Instruction with Nonhumans 
 
Sarah Trimmer’s children’s conduct manual, Fabulous Histories works within colonial, 
Enlightenment, and scientific curiosity discourses while also subverting them. Generally, 
Trimmer’s text endorses the Enlightenment human/animal hierarchy through anthropocentric 
storytelling and the Christian belief in animal inferiority. Fabulous Histories, however, argues 
against the practices of treating animals as curious objects for amusement and capturing animals 
as scientific curiosities. The text, at times, counters the anthropocentric narration by recognizing 
animals as subjects with their own desires, needs, and agency. This resonates with moments 
within Travels and The Travel Diary of Elizabeth House Trist that reject an objective, colonial 
naturalist view of animals. This children’s conduct manual also offers an interesting point of 
comparison because adults from Trimmer’s and Bartram’s generation could have had access to 
it. Essentially, examining Fabulous Histories alongside Travels and The Travel Diary offers 
insight into what this generation of Euroamericans might have taught their children about how to 
view animals. With the moments of animal advocacy weakened by Trimmer’s constant 
reminders of animal inferiority, Fabulous Histories provides a solid contrast to Travels and The 
Travel Diary, which contain animal advocacy or blur the human/animal binary without the 
caveat of human superiority.  
First published in London in 1786, the Fabulous Histories garnered a prolific 





1901) (WorldCat Database). In a biography of Trimmer’s life, published in 1817 in the New 
York-based periodical Christian Register Moral and Theological Review, the biographer makes 
it clear that Fabulous Histories was widely read by American children: 
The intention of this little work [Fabulous Histories] was to give children proper 
ideas of the treatment of animals; and, under the fictitious name of a Nest of 
Robins, to inculcate lessons of domestic virtue. This book being in the hands of 
most young people, it is unnecessary to say much respecting it; the reader will 
doubtless allow it the merit of being ingenious and interesting, and of conveying 
much useful instruction under a pleasing form. (“Biography” 10)  
Americans could have bought or read Fabulous Histories to their children during the same 
timeframe as when they read Bartram’s Travels—around 1794. Likewise, Trist’s diary was 
written only ten years prior to Travels. It is clear from early American periodicals, where 




In purchasing or sharing Fabulous Histories, early American parents endorsed the 
content, which included recognizing animals as more than objects. By uncovering the many 
degrees of animal subjectivity presented in early American texts (by this I mean texts written or 
read in early America), we garner a more complete picture of early American views of 
nonhumans. This examination of Fabulous Histories next to Bartram’s and Trist’s texts 
                                                 
7
 In 1807, the Boston-based newspaper the Christian Observer lists the text for sale as two volumes bound featuring 
“plates,” or illustrations (“List of New Publications” 193). The Philadelphia periodical the American Publishers’ 
Circular and Literary Gazette, lists Fabulous Histories for sale in 1856 as a book bound in paper-covered “boards,” 






demonstrates that some early American discourses entertained animal subjectivity in contrast to 
the discourse of curiosity.  
American Parents Buy Colonial Ideology 
 
Trimmer, “the most saleable children’s author of her day,” is remembered in part for 
developing the theory that children must read literature because it was “not only the key to 
personal development, and by extension, to society’s future, but also, potentially . . . the 
safeguard of the nation in a time of crisis” (Grenby 137, 156). Her children’s books were 
intended to shape good British citizens, which also entailed thinking like good colonizers. This 
colonizing world view in Fabulous Histories, which presents humans as the naturalized 
managers of nature, makes her depiction of some animals as subjects even more subversive. 
Trimmer’s books also promoted eighteenth-century Natural Theory, which posits that scientific 
study reveals how God shaped nature as a part of divine design (Cosslett 17). Trimmer believed 
that by examining animals and plants children would observe God’s will and design (17). Also, 
through scientific observation children would better understand animals and be less likely to 
harm them (19). Tess Cosslett explains how Trimmer often asked children “to think themselves 
into the subjectivity of animals” in order to convince them to treat animals with kindness (18). 
Fabulous Histories often uses this device to encourage children to be kind to animals. Fabulous 
Histories came into print during a transitional period in children’s literature, “a development 
from the rather static fable, in which each animal represents one emblematic quality, for the 
purposes of social satire and moral advice, to stories that also give natural historical information, 
plead for kindness to animals, and attempt to create animals as subjects as well as objects of 





conflicting messages fails to weaken what the text ultimately conveys to readers—an alternate 
paradigm through which to view animals as more than objects and deserving of respect. 
Although Trimmer sought to reinforce human/animal hierarchical structures throughout 
Fabulous Histories, the message of animal advocacy exudes a significant presence in the text. I 
argue that the subversive view of animals in this text resonates strongly with Bartram’s and 
Trist’s writings from a similar period in early America. Taken collectively, these texts could 
indicate a trend in opposition to objectifying animals in the eighteenth-century transatlantic 
culture of curiosity.  
Why did American parents purchase a book that taught children to treat animals as less-
than-human but also to reject the idea that they were curious objects for amusement? American 
naturalists appropriated British botanical methods, which resulted in a discourse that sought to 
control and colonize a distinctly “American” nature (Lewis). This colonial paradigm, therefore, 
may have resonated with Americans and made a suitable conduct manual for American children 
because it reflected the paradoxes of early American naturalist discourse—which involved 




Since the sixteenth century, British citizens viewed America as a site of knowledge 
production and the source of undiscovered “curious” specimens of plants, minerals, and animals 
(Parrish 8). The definition of curiosity in the seventeenth century was “associated with the 
negative, credulous aspects of wonder” and used to define “an anomalous wonder” or childlike 





signify “a new addition to an increasingly comprehensive and faithful catalogue of nature;” or “a 
reliable, detailed, and exhaustive” observer of the natural world (63). The boxing and shipping of 
these specimens and equating nonhuman nature with catalogued items linked “curiosity” to 
objectification. A human hierarchy was also inherent in discourses of eighteenth-century 
transatlantic curiosity. Curiosity was embodied by the affluent “English gentleman” examining 
natural objects to produce knowledge (75). Essentially women, colonial men, slaves, and other 
non-English were viewed as less than capable curious observers; however, colonial men and 
women still used various rhetorical strategies to assure English audiences of their reliable natural 
observations (75-76). Fabulous Histories, however, warns against both the seventeenth-century 
concept of viewing nonhuman nature as full of curious objects of wonder and amusement, and 
the eighteenth-century idea of capturing and cataloguing curious objects for knowledge 
production. Instead, the narrator encourages observation of nonhumans in their natural 
environments to avoid disturbing or harming them.  
 
Damaging Anthropocentric Metaphors  
 
By establishing how anthropocentric metaphors saturate Trimmer’s conduct manual and 
generate unproductive confusions of the human/animal binary, I consider how Trimmer’s 
contrasting passages function subversively. Anthropomorphism, more often than not, functions 
to remove real animal needs and concerns and replace them with human ones; this naturalizes the 
human/animal binary by forming a hierarchy of needs and privileges. As I explain in my 
introduction, contemporary scholars argue that dominant ideologies still proclaim the “natural” 





roots in Enlightenment thought (Bell, Donovan, Freeman, Haraway, Sanbonmatsu). Many 
scholars feel that the originators of the seventeenth-century European view of nature as a 
mechanical object either created or confirmed “man” as the dominator of nature: they “turned 
nature into the servant of men, into the distanced object that ensured his status as master” 
(Parrish 43). Anthropomorphic animal figures that speak human morals only further this human 
domination over animals. As Frank Palmeri notes, “animal fables are not about animals, but 
rather transpose human social relations onto the animal world in order to narrate and comment 
on human behavior” (83). Fabulous Histories follows this formula with an anthropomorphic 
family of robins. Anthropocentric metaphors, such as those employed in Fabulous Histories, 
deny the entangled relationship between humans and nonhumans and privilege human over 
nonhuman needs. Animals studies scholar Karen Raber explains that “the problems of 
anthropomorphism, anthrophocentrism, and speciesism, [are] the triumvirate of bad words for 
what people do to animals when they talk about them” (99). She argues that anthropomorphizing 
animals leads to anthropocentric thinking, which prioritizes humans over animals. Similarly, 
Murphy points out that anthropocentrism keeps humans from this interspecies interdependence; 
when humans force animals to wear our faces and mannerisms, nonhuman animals are obscured 
by human desires and needs (Literature, Nature, and Other 52). Later, I explain the moments 
where Fabulous Histories departs from this traditional anthropocentric fable formula and uses 
animals to instead address issues of the human treatment of animals.  
The story features a male and female robin who nest and hatch four eggs in the safe space 
of a human family’s garden. Trimmer presents the robins as a human, heteronormative family 





parents teach their children that adults, especially the father, should be obeyed, thereby 
establishing a patriarchal structure within the family. Essentially, the robins speak and act out 
human concerns as a way to instruct young readers about human moral behavior and their place 
in the metaphorical nest. The Redbreast family serves as an example of damaging 
anthropocentrism which threatens to erase the nonhuman animal completely in favor of 
naturalizing the myth of the separate and superior “human” life form. The robins are more than 
an “animal” foil for “humanity,” however; they also function as tools to instruct children in the 
workings of “human” patriarchal social structures and to teach them that animals rank below 
them in this hierarchy. Essentially, the robins operate as devices for humans to understand their 
own ideology. 
Human gender and family roles are clearly defined to align with dominant culture. The 
mother generally stays in the nest to care for the four children while the father leaves to search 
for food and provide for his family. The father robin also “chose to leave the female part of his 
family to the particular management of their mother” (92). This separates the roles of the mother 
and father; the mother is responsible for the domestic private space, while the father searches for 
food in the public space outside of the nest. The mother robin even yields to the father robin’s 
authority, sometimes acting only after “having obtained her mate’s consent” (15).  
As the robins speak with human voices and exhibit human social concerns, their actual 
needs and the way real robins see the world is overshadowed by the human masks they wear as 
the Redbreast family. The human voices that the robins use to teach human ideology to their 
offspring eclipse the manner in which actual robins communicate. One main example of this 





disobedient son (named Robin) that his parents have authority over him. Robin “failed to humble 
himself to his father” by not accepting his father’s flying advice, which results in his fall to the 
ground (92). After Robin is hurt, he realizes that he should have listened to his father’s advice 
and delivers a monologue about obedience: 
Oh! Cried he, that I had but followed the advice and example of my tender 
parents, then had I been safe in the nest, blessed with their kind caresses, and 
enjoying the company of my dear brother and sisters! But now I am of all birds, 
the most wretched! . . . What kind beak will supply me with food to assuage the 
pangs of hunger which I shall soon feel? . . . Who will protect me from the 
various tribes of barbarous animals which I have been told make prey of birds? 
(93) 
In this excerpt, the home is portrayed as a “safe” place with “tender” parents that “protect” and 
caress children (93). In contrast, existence away from home comes across as “wretched,” full of 
“pangs of hunger,” and “barbarous animals” (93). This language equates obedience in the home 
with protection, while portraying the natural world as a hazardous place without food or shelter 
from ravenous animals. With this reasoning, nature comes across as the enemy of the domestic 
family. This passage is one small piece of the larger text that follows the anthropomorphic 
Redbreast family as they deal with human social structures, therefore, displacing the 
representation of how actual robins live, think, speak or interact in nature. Anthropomorphic 
metaphors and anthropocentric views of the world such as those in Fabulous Histories contribute 
to the belief that humans are separate from and superior to animals. This line of thought only 





interaction. Anthropocentric thinking also reinforces belief in the artificial human/animal 
hierarchy by naturalizing it.  
Through the human characters’ interactions, Fabulous Histories also directly endorses 
the human/animal and domestic/wild binaries. The six-year-old boy named Frederick proposes to 
take responsibility for the robin family in living in his garden by using his allowance to buy bird 
feed: “O, said Frederick, I will give all the money I have in the world to buy victuals for my 
dear, dear birds” (15). His expression of compassion towards the birds is countered by his 
mother. She responds to this by quickly correcting him that he is “human” and should therefore 
help his own kind before “inferior” animals:  
[T]hough I commend your humanity, I must remind you again, that there are poor 
people as well as poor birds. . . . I am delighted, my dear children, with your 
humane behaviour towards the animal creation, and wish by all means to 
encourage it. But though a most commendable propensity, it requires regulation; 
let me therefore recommend to you, not to suffer it, to gain upon you to such a 
degree, as to make you unhappy or forgetful of those, who have a superior claim 
to your attention: I mean poor people; always keep in mind the distresses which 
they endure, and on no account waste any kind of food, nor give to inferior 
animals what is designed for mankind. (15-16)  
Here, the animal presence of the robins acts as a foil to construct the humanity of young 
Frederick. The authority figure of the mother reaffirms that humans are “superior” to the birds 
and deserve to be cared for before “inferior animals” (15). Frederick’s mother instructs him to 





this line of reasoning is that birds do not need human care or food to survive in nature. The 
mother speaks in this passage as if sustenance only exists in the human-made home and never 
acknowledges that birds survive in the wild without human help. This reinforces the 
Enlightenment belief in a human-dominated hierarchy over animals. It even naturalizes the idea 
of a safer human domestic space over “animalized” nature.  
 
Children, Respect the Animals 
 
In contrast with the anthropomorphic presentation of the robins, the text speaks against 
treating animals as curiosities for amusement and objectifying animals to justify violence against 
nonhumans. The text also encourages observing animals in their natural environment instead of 
as captured objects. Immediately after the anthropomorphic robin passage, Fredrick’s mother 
demands he respect a butterfly trapped in his home and release it into its natural environment. 
Despite being juxtaposed with the anthropomorphic portrayal of the robins, this butterfly 
encounter argues for adults to teach children to respect insects as subjects with agency. The 
butterfly passage differs from the robin passage because Frederick’s mother instructs him to 
leave the butterfly alone. The mother makes it clear that treating the butterfly as a play-thing will 
lead to harming it: “This [butterfly] Frederick was very desirous of catching, but his mamma 
would not permit him to attempt it; because (she told him) he could not well lay hold of its wings 
without doing it an injury, and it would be much happier at liberty” (16). The butterfly’s well-
being is more important than Frederick’s desire to catch the butterfly for his amusement. This 
contrasts with the anthropomorphic presentation of the robins that conflates actual bird needs 





She also encourages him to imagine himself in the insect’s place: “Should you like, Frederick, 
said she, when you are going out to play, to have any body lay hold on you violently, scratch you 
all over, then offer you something to eat which is very disagreeable, and perhaps poisonous, and 
then shut you up in a little dark room?” (16-17). The text leads young readers to place 
themselves in the captured butterfly’s position. This passage demonstrates how to respect the 
butterfly by putting the insect’s needs before the child’s desire to be entertained. It also sends the 
message that capturing any insects as curious objects harms them. After Frederick imagines 
himself in the position of the butterfly, he asks his mother to let it outside and she instructs her 
children to open a window to release it.  
The narrator describes the butterfly’s reaction to the open window in a manner that shows 
recognition of its individual subjectivity: “the happy insect seized the opportunity of escaping, 
and Frederick had soon the pleasure of seeing it on a rose-tree” (17). The butterfly reacts to the 
open window by flying outside, thereby demonstrating his individual agency. Frederick 
continues to observe the butterfly in the garden and his spirits are lifted in reaction to the 
butterfly’s behavior: “Frederick, during his walk, amused himself with watching the Butterfly, as 
it flew from flower to flower which gave more pleasure than he could possibly have received 
from catching and confining the little tender creature” (17). Frederick’s happiness with watching 
the liberated butterfly exercise its agency in a natural environment shows readers how mutual 
respect benefits all beings involved and promotes observing nonhumans in their natural 
environments instead of as caged or captured curious objects. This entire butterfly vignette 
conveys the message that humans should resist any desire to capture, or confine nonhumans as 





young readers can empathize with Frederick, mothers reading this to their children may also gain 
strategies for preventing their children from capturing and harming insects. This passage acts as 
one of the strongest examples of the presence of this counter-discourse because most of the 
examples feature a reminder that God made humans superior to animals.  
 Trimmer clarifies this viewpoint in the advertisement in the front matter of the book; 
while “Christian Benevolence” entails being compassionate to animals, “immoderate tenderness . 
. . towards those, over whom the SUPREME GOVENOR hath given them dominion” is incorrect 
(vi). Although these instances of animal advocacy are qualified by the Christian belief that God 
made humans naturally superior guardians of nonhumans, something other than mere 
objectification or anthropocentric thinking occurs. Trimmer links “immoderate tenderness” 
towards animals to animal-hoarding behavior, which ultimately leads to the neglect of humans 
and nonhumans alike. Again, seeing animals as objects for amusement is presented as the 
gateway to harming humans and nonhumans.  
Mrs. Addis, a family friend, keeps a strange menagerie of animals in her drawing room, 
including “a parrot, a paroquet, and a macaw, all in most elegant cages . . . a squirrel and a 
monkey, which had each a little house neatly ornamented . . . a lapdog lying on a splendid 
cushion; and in a beautiful little cradle . . . a cat with a litter of kittens” (97-98). This excerpt 
shows how Mrs. Addis displays and keeps these animals as curious objects for human 
amusement. She keeps the exotic animals chained and caged in her house and fails to respect 
their individual needs. Mrs. Addis’s children are also neglected in this arrangement; she keeps 
her boy in boarding school only to keep him away from her animals. She also spends her time 





quite shocked to see how sickly, dirty, and ragged this child was, and what a very vulgar figure 
she made, for want of instruction” (100). This definition of “immoderate tenderness” suggests 
that keeping animals as ornamental objects in such a manner interferes with human ability to 
operate productively in human society. It also portrays the harm done to animals when their 
distinct needs are ignored in favor of human desires. Despite warning about being too fond of 
animals and reinforcing the belief in human superiority, the text still advocates for the rights of 
nonhumans in specific passages that function to model a relationship of mutual respect, which 
counters the discourse of animals as curious objects.  
When Frederick expresses his desire to cage the robins in the garden that he feeds, his 
mother explains that caging birds for human pleasure only harms birds. The same tactic that was 
used with the butterfly is employed here. Frederick’s mother asks him to imagine himself in the 
position of the birds to determine if keeping birds in captivity would be wrong: “And would you 
really confine these sweet creatures in a cage, Frederick, merely to have the pleasure of looking 
at them? Should you like to be always shut up in a little room?” (35). The mother explains that 
birds experience similar emotions to those of humans, which is a powerful statement, even 
though she qualifies it by saying they are lesser beings: “Though these little animals are inferior 
to you, there is no doubt but they are capable of enjoyments similar to these [human pleasures]; 
and it must be a dreadful life for a poor bird to be shut up in a cage, where he cannot so much as 
make use of his wings—where he is excluded from his natural companions” (36). The statement 
that birds remain inferior, along with acknowledgement of a hierarchy where the birds play with 
“natural companions,” authorizes the call for compassion towards animals, recognition of their 





As with the butterfly and the robins, Frederick’s mother explains that keeping song birds 
in cages for human amusement is wrong because it hurts them. She describes her rescue of a pet 
canary that was released into the wild because the owner did not like the way it sang. She finds 
the canary unused to English weather and abused by native birds: “I could not help fancying the 
little creature to be like a foreigner just landed from some distant country, followed by a rude 
rabble of boys” (37). Where her neighbor disposed of the canary simply because its song failed 
to please, Frederick’s mother demonstrates a keen awareness of the bird’s needs by comparing it 
to a human stranger who needs her help. Much like the crying, child-like bear in Bartram’s 
Travels (examined in chapter three of this thesis), Trimmer’s anthropomorphic description of the 
bird acts as a device to elevate its status from that of a broken object of amusement to a fellow 
subject in need. She provides the bird with a large cage in her warm home, procures a mate for 
company, and eventually bestows the canaries and their offspring on a friend with an aviary. 
Frederick’s mother further explains that she keeps larks to save them from being eaten: 
“Quantities of them are killed and sold for the spit . . . I frequently buy them, as you know, 
Harriet, but as soon as the fine weather returns, I constantly set them at liberty” (38). Like the 
narrator in Travels, examined later in chapter three, these characters model for readers how 
keeping nonhumans, such as birds and insects, as objects of amusement only harms nonhumans.  
The text also describes how keeping animals as public curiosities hurts them. The 
mother’s explanation of the Learned Pig in London, who spells words by choosing letters on 
cards, argues against using animals as public scientific curiosities: “I would advise you, Harriet, 
never to give countenance to those people who shew what they call learned animals; as you may 





is most likely among the number” (72). The mother tells her daughter never to view animals 
performing for public amusement because they only perform after suffering “great barbarities” at 
human hands.  
Frederick and his sister Harriet’s discussion with their playmate Edward Jenkins 
illustrates how young readers might put the animal advocacy that Trimmer describes into action. 
Edward suggests that “it would have been a nice diversion to you to toss the young birds [the 
robins that live in Frederick’s garden] about” (58). He boasts to Frederick and Harriet that he 
collected at least a hundred bird’s eggs from nests: “I blow out the inside, and then run a thread 
through them, and give them to Lucy [his sister] to hang up amongst her curiosities, and very 
pretty they look, I assure you” (58). Harriet’s response to Edward echoes the teachings of her 
mother by asking if he would: “rather see a parcel of empty egg-shells, than hear a sweet concert 
of birds singing in the trees?” (58). Harriett’s words devalue the eggs as objects in favor of 
hearing wild birds’ sing. This response calls for valuing birds in their natural environment 
instead of draining the eggs to decorating human homes.   
Fabulous Histories advocates for the subjectivity of domestic as well as “wild” animals 
by arguing that seeing animals as objects leads to violence against them. The neighbor Edward 
embodies this idea. Edward tries to tie Harriet’s dog and cat together to watch them fight. While 
Frederick and Harriet convince Edward to leave the pets alone, he explains that he enjoys 
throwing cats off of roofs for fun: “[W]e tied bladders to each side of their necks, and then flung 
them from the top of the house. There was an end of their purring and mewing for some time, I 
assure you, for they lay a long while struggling and gasping for breath . . . but at last up they 





convinces strangers to beat and shoot to death a neighbor’s dog whom he characterizes as a mad 
dog, drowns puppies in front of their mother, makes cocks fight each other until they are cut and 
blinded, and plucks a live chicken. Edward demonstrates how naturalizing animal inferiority and 
denying nonhuman feeling and emotions is a slippery slope toward rationalizing violence against 
nonhumans. Edward explains to Harriet that he has a right to use animals as he pleases for his 
amusement because they cannot feel: “why have we not a right to do as we please to dogs and 
cats, or do you think they feel as we do? [emphasis original]” (63). 
Although the call to respect nonhumans remains qualified by the Christian belief that 
humans are superior to animals and is folded into the anthropocentric morality tale of the 
Redbreast robin family, Fabulous Histories also moves toward a more mutually respectful 
relationship between humans and nonhumans that counters the discourse of animals as 
curiosities. The text presents Edward, Mrs. Addis, and the trainers of the Learned Pig as 
examples of how seeing wild and domestic animals as objects for amusement may easily lead to 
violence against them. Even though the butterfly’s response to the open window stands as one of 
the few examples of an animal expressing his/her agency through a responsive movement in 
Fabulous Histories, Trimmer’s text proclaims animals as beings with needs and desires 
independent of humanity in the interactions between Mrs. Benson, her children, and her animals. 
The examples from Bartram’s and Trist’s texts, which omit outright statements of “human 
superiority,” appear as even stronger arguments for animals as subjects against the backdrop of 
the anthropocentric and Trimmer’s text.  
Aaron Bell argues that as long as compassion and respect for nonhumans is couched in 





naturalize human superiority, humans will continue to rationalize violence against beings 
considered less-than-human:  
If we are finally to abandon the self-aggrandizing narrative of anthropocentricism 
constructed in the West, we will have to begin by reconceptualizing the difference 
between humans and animals in a way that does not operate under a destructive 
exclusionary logic. Both for human beings and for animals, any cession of 
violence under the current logic is only a momentary deferment . . . Even 
moments of apparent tenderness and compassion become grotesque symptoms of 
a corrupted order so long as this way of life is permitted to stand. (174)  
In the context of this argument, the moments of compassion in Trimmer’s manual are corrupted 
by the discussion of animal inferiority. Travels and The Travel Diary, however, lack this blatant 
exclusionary logic and instead model steps to move toward reconceptualizing human and 
nonhuman relationships—making these and similarly subversive early American texts vital for 
fertilizing the discussion of how to move forward as a nation and plant the seeds to reimagine a 






CHAPTER THREE: LISTENING TO THE NONHUMAN OTHER 
 
 
An Ecocritical/Human-Animal Studies Reexamination of William Bartram’s Travels 
 
The evening was temperately cool and calm. The crocodiles began to roar and appear in 
uncommon numbers along the shores and in the river. I fixed my camp in an open plain . . . 
I had free prospect of the river, which was a matter of no trivial consideration to me having 
good reason to dread the subtle attacks of the allegators, who were crowding about my 
harbour . . .  
William Bartram (Travels 75).  
 
In the above passage from his eighteenth-century travel journal Quaker naturalist William 
Bartram describes the bank of the St. John’s River in Florida where he encountered and fought 
with roaring and bellowing alligators. This ordeal culminates in an intense interspecies faceoff as 
a twelve-foot long alligator confronts Bartram and climbs ashore to stare the traveler down. In 
this moment, alligator and human-animal acknowledge and challenge each other for a catch of 
fish in the narrator’s canoe. Seeing that the alligator is not afraid of him, Bartram kills the hungry 
reptile by “lodging the contents of [his] gun in his head” (75-77). At first glance this frequently 
anthologized passage, like the other descriptions of animal deaths in Travels, might seem to 
portray Bartram the literary character as an adventure-seeking hunter.
8
 While Bartram records 
the same actions as hunters during his travels, he captures something more than hunting— 
moments in the lives of early American frontier animals and the narrator’s reactions to 
encountering these animals and often witnessing their deaths.  
This project focuses on these moments of human and animal interaction, where the blurring 
of the human/animal boundary occurs, because, while other scholars have touched upon this 
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issue, none have explored it deeply from an ecofeminist/ human-animal studies paradigm. M. 
Allewaert, for example, considers human subjectivity but not animal subjectivity. Allewaert 
argues that the narrator’s experiences in the swamp shatter the Anglo-European fantasy of 
Edmund Burke’s sublime because the narrator experiences immediate danger—Burke’s sublime 
spectator stays safe and separate from the dangerous spectacle being observed (344-45).
9
 
Bartram’s inability to maintain a safe, sublime order in his narration leaves his own human 
subjectivity undefined against the threatening backdrop of the swamp while also resisting the 
subject-object separation of colonial discourse that the sublime enables (345). In another 
example, Matthew Wynn Sivils approaches Travels from an ecocritical perspective but uses a 
different focus than that of human-animal studies theory. Sivils argues that Travels features a 
mixture of “pastoral imagery and biological description” to vividly convey interdependent 
ecological communities of the early American frontier (58). In one example, Sivils identifies the 
comparison of humans to a community of mayflies as a literary device to teach humans “about 
the human condition within the natural world” (60-62). This thesis chapter, however, argues that 
the human and animal encounters in the text teach readers about something more than the 
“human” condition—these moments show the narrator recognizing animal subjectivity and 
advocating for animals.  
To recover the nonhuman semiotic exchanges, I examine the narrator’s acknowledgement 
of and responses to the communication of a bear cub, a spider, sandhill cranes, rattlesnakes, and 
an alligator; and argue that the narrator presents these overlooked nonhuman animals as 
“speaking” subjects with agency. In each account, the narrative moves from an objective to a 
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subjective view. The narrator seems to be moving nonhuman marginalized animals into focus 
because dominant cultural constructions present animals as objects. To signal this change in 
vision, Bartram acknowledges a connection with nonhumans and seeks to respect their individual 
agency.  
Published in 1791, Travels through North & South Carolina, Georgia, East & West 
Florida represents Bartram’s edited account of his earlier four year trek across the southern 
colonial American frontier to catalogue plants and animals for his British employer, Dr. John 
Fothergill, a Fellow of the Royal Society of London. Bartram appealed to Fothergill to sponsor 
his seed-and specimen-gathering trip after his failed careers as a trader and Florida planter, 
mounting debts, and increased pressure to live up to his father’s reputation as the King’s Botanist 
(Magee 46-47,71-73, 85-89). This journey brought the nature-loving Bartram face-to-face with a 
plethora of real American animals such as a bear cub, a silky haired spider, a sandhill crane, a 
rattlesnake, and the “old daring” alligator (Bartram lvii, lxi, 139-40, 170, 77). Scholars generally 
agree that Travels stands as a forerunner to American nature writing such as Walden (1854), 
Annie Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (1974), and many other American nature texts (Charles 
H. Adams 66; Hallock 150). Philip G. Terrie even marks Travels as the beginning of the 
American nature writing tradition, noting his influence on Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Emerson 
(17-18).  
While scholars often remark upon many subtly subversive qualities of Travels, none 
explore the moments where the narrator presents animals as subjects with agency.
10
 Thomas 
Hallock acknowledges that while Travels includes visions of a frontier developed for human use, 
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the narrator also appreciates nature in its undeveloped state (169-72). Charles H. Adams 
identifies Bartram’s playful, diverse writing style as ecological rhetoric, which he sees as 
Bartram’s attempt to go beyond scientific classification and fully depict the complexity of 
nonhuman frontier life. Adams explains that the ecological rhetoric in Travels consciously resists 
attributes of dominant writing styles to mirror the diversity of nature and illustrate the 
interdependence of all living beings (72-73). Adams explains that Travels succeeds in this effort 
by creating “an effect analogous to Bakhtinian polyphony, a rhetorical pluralism in which no 
single discourse can represent the full range of nature’s meaning” (72). Allewaert also reads 
Travels as resistant to the colonial nationalism of the early republic that insisted on appropriating 
land and resources for the new nation. According to Allewaert, humans gain agency by working 
with nonhuman nature to resist the economics and politics of the plantation zone. Bartram 
complicates the objectifying Linnaean naming system by explaining how plants and humans are 
interdependent in the plantation zone for survival (340-43).  
By most accounts, the naturalist occupation precluded viewing animals and humans as 
equals. Early Euroamerican botanists appropriated British colonial naturalist cataloging methods 
for use in the new republic. The Enlightenment belief in a solid human/animal boundary carried 
over to these British naturalist methods (Lewis 68).
 
According to the Great Chain of Being 
theory, all living beings fit into a linear, hierarchal chain ranging from least to most advanced, 
with humans as the most superior beings; naturalists’ use of Linnaean taxonomy supported this 
theory (Magee 148-51). Belief in a “natural” hierarchy of beings and that nonhuman nature 





human (Bell 165-166). Essentially, the idea that humans could control and manipulate nature 
stood central to Enlightenment and, later, naturalist thought (Magee 132).
 11
  
Ecofeminist theory assumes that all beings are harmed when humans categorize in ways 
that create binaries (man/nature, human/animal, etc.) and that mark as “less than” one side of the 
binary (Gates 21). Such binaries enable and rationalize systems of domination and oppression. 
American botanists who appropriated European naturalist research methods were therefore more 
likely to see nonhuman animals and nature as Other. Evidence suggests that they in fact viewed 
nature as an object and attempted to colonize nature by defining and claiming a distinctly 
“American” wilderness (Lewis 65-69). Timothy Sweet proposes that nature emerged as an object 
upon which early Euroamericans built the foundation of the fledgling nation’s economy—an 
unsustainable eco-economic base that he says Americans still continue to rely upon (Sweet 422). 
These Enlightenment beliefs and naturalist practices emerge in early Euroamerican travel writing 
as calls to “civilize,” and “improve” the American frontier through settlement, deforestation and 
farming (Imbarrato 70).  
With my ecocritical/human-animal studies lens I find more than another subversion of 
Enlightenment colonial discourse; I recover the voices of nonhuman Others in the text, the 
emotional responses that they elicit from the narrator, and the narrator’s appeals to respect 
nonhuman animals. This chapter opens a new way to understand the narrator’s relationship with 
animals in Travels—as a form of early American nonhuman advocacy. Is Bartram’s text also a 
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precursor to American animal rights writings? The nonhuman emotions, connections, and 
interspecies communication that the narrator in Travels describes continue to be perceived as 
extraordinary instead of the norm. Examining this early Euroamerican text is useful for 
beginning to explain why Americans relate to animals the way we do today and broaching the 
discussion about more respectful and sustainable ways to relate to animals.  
 
(Re)conceptualizing Speaking Subjects to Recover Voices 
 
In order to uncover the animal voices in Travels I use a non-anthropocentric definition of 
subjectivity, which accepts nonhuman knowledge, communication, and ways of knowing. The 
narrator in Travels acknowledging nonhuman semiotic exchanges as communication ultimately 
allows him to view them as subjects, respect them, and advocate on their behalf. Defining 
subjectivity as any being capable of responding, even non-volitionally, allows for a definition 
that includes more than humans. According to Patrick D. Murphy, when fiction models an 
expanded type of subjectivity, it creates a space where humans can see and acknowledge a 
greater connection with the nonhuman world, which leads to greater respect for it (“Subjects”). 
The narrator in Travels acknowledges and is moved by various animals’ semiotic exchanges so 
much that his language changes to acknowledge their subjectivity after he perceives them as 
communicating with him. Murphy argues that a more accurate portrayal of human connectedness 
with the natural world in fiction reduces the harmful behavior that results from perceiving one’s 
identity as detached from the world: 
These fictions distinguish rather than conflate the subject of their plots and the 





bodies, the selves identified with those bodies and the subject positions and 
identities that develop for those embodied selves. As a result, this latter group of 
literary texts offers more complex and thereby more realistic representations of 
human entanglement and engagement in the rest of the material world. It is my 
contention that such complex representations can play an important part in 
developing a potentially less destructive form of human self-perception than the 
one dominant in the cultures in which these works are written. (“Subjects” 122) 
Murphy defines subjectivity not in terms of the capacity for human language or human 
knowledge but instead as the ability to respond to another being with “any form of semiotic 
exchange,” which includes “non-volitional utterances” (123-24).  
 
“Accessary to what now appeared to be a cruel murder” 
 
Travels begins as Bartram reviews the most significant discoveries about plants and 
animals from his journey through the early American frontier. Among his discoveries he 
recounts witnessing hunters murder a bear for “the sake of the skin and oil” and then killing the 
bear’s cub as he was crying for his mother (lvii). The tone of narration before the murder of the 
mother bear describes her and her cub as objects. This tone shifts to acknowledge the bears’ 
subjectivity as a result of the cub’s cries and gestures: 
[In] the evening my hunter, who was an excellent marksman, said that he would 
shoot one of [the bears], for the sake of the skin and oil, for we had plenty and 
variety of provisions in our bark. We accordingly, on sight of two of them, 





shore, in order to get under cover of a small island, this we cautiously coasted 
round, to a point . . . we gained gradually on our prey by this artifice, without their 
noticing us, finding ourselves near enough, the hunter fired, and laid the largest 
dead on the spot, where she stood, when presently the [cub], not seeming the least 
moved, at the report of our piece, approached the dead body. (lvii) 
This passage is narrated with a procedural and methodical tone. The narrator explains that the 
hunter plans to kill a bear, describes how they approach unseen for a good shot, and that the 
hunter killed the bear in a single shot. The detached narration lacks any emotion and simply 
states the strategy of the hunters. Essentially, the objectification of the bears enables the murder; 
the responsibility for destroying an object is much less than that for killing a subject. The 
narrator never names the hunters but instead only calls them “hunters,” defining them in relation 
to their ability to kill animals. He praises his hired hunter as “an excellent marksman” (lvii).  
As the narrator describes his part in the pursuit of the mother bear, he simply calls her 
“our prey” and “the largest” (lvii). Categorizing the bear as “prey” and “the largest” denies the 
bear’s subjectivity and, therefore, individuality and ability for semiotic exchange. This language 
separates “bearness” from “humanness.” Calling the bear large prey disguises the killing of a 
subject who is capable of response. The term “prey” invokes the construct of the hunter, which 
works to naturalize the actions of the men. As “prey,” the bear is seen as an object of the hunt, 
destined to be shot and used by humans. Also, by describing the mother bear as simply “the 
largest,” she is itemized as the object with the most capital value, the most fur and oil. This 
language functions to distance “humans” from the bears by denying the bears’ individual worth. 





Haraway explains that that the belief that humans are separate and superior to animals exists as a 
myth designed to define “human” against the “animal” (When Species Meet 77-78). This belief 
creates false boundaries between human animals and nonhuman animals, which leads to the 
reduction of those categorized as nonhuman objects. Haraway calls for a confusion of these sorts 
of boundaries to escape false generalizations and dichotomies (Symians 163-64). 
From an ecocritical perspective Bartram’s hunting party pursues the bears not for 
sustenance but only for their fur and oil, wasting their meat. The hunters with Bartram lack 
respect for the individual animals by failing to acknowledge the significance of killing them. 
Hunting practices which align closer to an ecocritical paradigm than the actions of Bartram’s 
hunting party existed in early America. Early American Powhatan hunters, for example, believed 
a successful hunt occurred because of the hunter’s skill, the will of the spirits, and the animal 
offering itself to humans because of a relationship of mutual respect: “Hunting was not only a 
display of human prowess but also an opportunity to acknowledge the reciprocal relations 
linking men and animals. Guided by spiritual protectors, animals offered themselves as gifts to 
humans in return for evidence of gratitude and respect” (DeJohn Anderson 28-29). Although 
skilled marksmen, the hunters with Bartram fail to see their connection with the nonhumans, 
respect their prey as subjects with agency, and only see the successful hunt as a result of their 
individual skills. This anthropocentric view of the hunt prevents them from engaging in a 







The Child-like Cub Cries Out 
 
Immediately after the mother bear is shot “dead on the spot,” Bartram refers to her as 
“she” for the first time (lvii). This indicates that by watching her die he became aware of the loss 
of her individual life. In this passage the narrator also notices the cub speak as a subject, an 
individual telling his story and expressing his agency through his gestures and cries: 
[The cub] approached the dead body, smelled, and pawed it, and appearing in 
agony, fell to weeping and looking upwards, then towards us, and cried out like a 
child. Whilst our boat approached very near, the hunter was loading his rifle in 
order to shoot the survivor, which was a young cub, and the slain supposed to be 
the dam. (lvii)  
In this passage, the cub breaks through the narration to express his emotions. Viewing these cries 
and gestures with Murphy’s definition of subjectivity, they express the bear’s individual 
subjectivity. The cub witnesses his mother fall after being shot; approaches, and “smelled, and 
pawed” her body (lvii). With these gestures the cub tries to communicate with his mother; he 
urges her to respond. The lack of a response leads him to react “in agony, [and] fall to weeping” 
(lvii). The cub’s expressions of suffering confirm that he is a subject expressing his loss and not 
a mere prey object, or object of scientific study.  
Although the narrator describes the cub’s emotions anthropomorphically, this 
anthropomorphism aids the narrator in conveying the cub’s subjectivity. By depicting him as an 
“afflicted child, bereft of its parent,” the powerful image of a crying human child encourages 
humans to extend the same sympathies for the cub as an orphaned human child (lvii). According 





impulses,” or “instinct” (Bartram lvi). The child-like cub connotes feelings, emotions, and the 
pain of a mother’s death, thereby disrupting the image of animals as pure instinctual beings. 
Some Ecofeminist and human-animal studies scholars explain that in most instances 
anthropomorphizing animals leads to anthropocentric thinking, which prioritizes humans over 
nonhumans (Symians, Haraway; Literature, Nature, and Other, Murphy106-16; Raber 99). Karla 
Armbruster argues, however, that anthropomorphic animal figures can be used to explore messy, 
intertwined human and nonhuman relationships by complicating the boundary between human 
and animal instead of collapsing it and erasing the animal (106-16). Likewise, in the narrator’s 
encounter with the cub, human traits are ascribed to the cub illustrating similarities between 
human and bear emotions instead of erasing the cub’s emotions. The cub’s cries are described as 
child-like, which makes the suffering in the cub’s voice relatable enough for humans to 
recognize his suffering. Therefore, while associating the bear cub with a human child risks 
missing the cub’s suffering entirely, viewing the anthropomorphic aspects of the bear cub shows 
human and bear similarities.  
In the following passage, the narrator describes his own reciprocal emotional response 
triggered by watching and listening to the cub: 
[T]he continual cries of this afflicted child, bereft of its parent, affected me very 
sensibly, I was moved with compassion, and charging myself as if accessary to 
what now appeared to be a cruel murder, and endeavoured to prevail on the hunter 
to save its life, but to no effect! (lvii) 
The narrator remarks that the cub’s vocalized anguish “affected [him] very sensibly” and 





realization that the animal experiences feeling direct his use of the word murder. The word 
“murder” connotes an acknowledgement of the bear’s subjectivity. Essentially, when the narrator 
chooses the word “murder” to describe the death of the mother bear at the hunter’s hands, his 
word choice shows that that she is a subject that can be murdered. Haraway explains that saying 
only “humans” can be “murdered” is a semantic tactic, which comes from our denial that 
nonhuman animals are capable of response; this denial maintains the false label of “human” in 
contrast to the instinctual “animal” (When Species Meet 77-79).  
In addition to the narrator’s emotional reaction to the mother bear’s death and the cub’s 
cries, he advocates for the cub, demanding that the hunter let him live: the narrator “endeavoured 
to prevail on the hunter to save its life, but to no effect!” (lvii). The narrator explains that that 
hunter fails to perceive the bears as beings worthy of compassion. The hunter is blind to the 
human and nonhuman kinship that the narrator sees through the cub’s expressions of suffering. 
Therefore, the hunter is unable to see shooting the cub as killing a fellow subject: “for by habit 
he had become insensible to compassion towards the brute creation, being now within a few 
yards of the harmless devoted victim, he fired, and laid it dead upon the body of the dam” (lvii). 
Even though the narrator fails to advocate for the cub to the hunter, he still comes to see the 
bears as speaking subjects with emotions and agency that deserve to live.  
 
From Other to (An)other 
 
In the same passage, the narrator exhibits another vital component to acknowledging 
nonhuman subjectivity and the human connection to the nonhuman world: recognizing that the 





from his procedural, objectifying gaze, after the mother bear’s death and the cub’s cries, he 
recognizes that the cub gazes back at him. Murphy explains “anotherness” as understanding that 
“one’s self is always someone else’s other, and both are another to each other” (Literature, 
Nature, and Other 137). Respect for species diversity and interdependence accompany this 
recognition of (an)other being’s gaze. The narrator acknowledges the cub as (an)other when he 
explains to readers how the cub looks back at the hunting party: “[the cub was] looking upwards, 
then towards us, and cried out like a child” (lvii). By recognizing the cub’s ability to look back at 
the hunters and himself, the narrator then functions as (an)other being to the cub. The narrator’s 
recognition of the cub gazing back acts in conjunction with the anthropomorphic depiction of his 
cries to depict the cub as an agent expressing himself. Through the image of a child-like cub—
“this afflicted child, bereft of its parent”—looking at the killers of his mother while crying, the 
cub is empowered with a knowing, intelligent gaze that demonstrates that nonhuman nature 
looks back at us (lvii) The narrator, therefore, recognizes that the cub exists as (an)other being, 
instead of something Other. The narrator also repeats this realization when he sees a spider as 
(an)other.  
 
Seeing the Nonhuman in the Meal 
 
Later in Travels, the narrator presents a similar scene of recognition, but this time he 
expresses a greater degree of interconnectedness and advocacy for nonhumans. The narrator’s 
objectifying scientist’s gaze transforms to advocacy for the hunted animal when the hunting 





shoot the bird and bring his body to camp for dinner. The narrator records all of the details of the 
crane with scientific objectivity: 
This stately bird is above six feet in length from toes to the extremity of the beak 
when extended, and the wings expand eight or nine feet; they are above five feet 
high when standing erect; the tail is remarkably short, but the flag or pendant 
feathers which fall down off the rump on each side, are very long and sharp 
pointed, of a delicate texture, and silky softness . . . the crown of the head bare of 
feathers, of a reddish rose colour, thinly barbed with short, stiff black hair. (139)  
After thoroughly measuring each part of the crane, recording the various shapes and colors of his 
feathers, and describing how his wings fit to the body and operate for flight, the narrator’s tone 
becomes regretful. As with the bear vignette, after the narrator’s initial observations, he 
transitions to explaining how the crane is a speaking subject capable of expressing “passions and 
affections” through bird language (140). While Bartram depicts the bears as displaying family 
ties and rational and emotional behavior after he witnesses the mother bear’s murder, the 
moment of transition in the crane passage occurs when he eats the crane in soup.  
The narrator immediately visualizes the crane when he looks at the soup, unlike the 
unacknowledged animals that he considered “provisions” at the beginning of the bear passage.
12
  
He knows he consumes another living being that was “shot in the adjoining meadows” (139). 
When the crane soup is served, Bartram’s descriptions shift from objective to portraying the bird 
as an otherworldly being. He imagines the crane flying, instead of floating in his soup: 
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We had this fowl dressed for supper and it made excellent soup; nevertheless as 
long as I can get any other necessary food I shall prefer his seraphic music in the 
etherial skies, and my eyes and understanding gratified in observing their 
economy and social communities, in the expansive green savannas of Florida. 
(140) 
Although the narrator admits that the “foul” makes “excellent soup,” he vows never to eat crane 
again because he would rather hear “seraphic music in the etherial skies” (140). The choice of 
the words “seraphic” and “etherial” connote an angelic and heavenly being—clearly an idealized 
image of cranes. These words also imply that cranes exist as superhuman creatures, making the 
human killing and consumption of him seem more unfortunate.  
The narrator’s idealization of the dead crane makes sense in light of his depiction of birds 
in the introduction, in which the narrator describes how he admires birds because they 
communicate, possess emotions, and live interdependently. The narrator explains that he sees 
birds as particularly intelligent beings with the capacity to communicate with each other via 
language; he clarifies that this language birds use is unique to birds: “language in birds, is the 
common notes or speech, that they use when employed in feeding themselves and their young, 
calling on one another, as well as their menaces against their enemy” (lix-lx). Here he also 
explains that some birds even work interdependently to care for orphaned young from other 
species (lx). This information clarifies what the narrator means by envisioning the cranes 
interacting in “social communities” (140). In light of this information from the introduction, the 





other beings, meaning he viewed him as a subject before he examined and ate him, which 
explains the regret.  
As he reflects upon the significance of the crane’s death, the narrator expresses regret by 
vowing never to eat another crane “as [he] can get any other necessary food” (140). This signals 
that the narrator accepts responsibility for the crane’s death—that the crane died to feed humans. 
In this way, Bartram models Haraway’s concept of living responsibly within the need to kill. 
Haraway offers that humans should recognize the significance of each animal killing and “learn 
to live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing,” instead of using 
semantics to naturalize animal killing for the benefit of “humans;” in short, humans need to 
recognize “that earthly heterogeneous beings are in this web together for all time, and no one 
gets to be Man” (When Species Meet 80, 82).  
Bartram also explains how his livelihood as a naturalist depends on the presence of 
nonhuman animals like the crane. The narrator says that he learns about the cranes from cranes, 
demonstrating his recognition of his dependence on the birds for knowledge. Also, beyond 
knowledge, the aurally and visually pleasing cranes provide him with a source of enjoyment: 
“my eyes and understanding gratified in observing their economy and social communities, in the 
expansive green savannas of Florida” (140). Murphy argues that recognition of interanimation 
(the ways that species learn and grow through interaction with each other) leads to interspecies 
growth and survival (Literature, Nature, and Other 23). As Bartram regretfully digests one of 
these birds that assisted in his growth as a naturalist, the narrator advocates for all cranes to be 





entanglement: Bartram needed to eat the crane for food but regrets his death because cranes 
bring him enjoyment and knowledge.  
Because neither Bartram nor the reader sees the crane alive, the crane is unable to 
communicate for himself in the text. Unlike Bartram’s treatment of the bear cub, in which 
anthropomorphic metaphors risk describing an animal with human qualities to portray him as a 
speaking subject, the narrator avoids these metaphors. Although he does attempt to idealize the 
crane as an otherworldly, angelic being, when contextualized with the information in the 
introduction, it is clear the narrator sees the cranes as subjects. Like the bear vignette, this 
passage demonstrates a shift from objectifying a nonhuman with scientific observations to 
lauding the crane’s subjectivity. In this example, however, the shift was based on previous 
observations of crane semiotic capability. This encounter still contained a form of avocation for 
all cranes: a reflection on why cranes should be left in the sky instead of eaten as a meal.  
 
When (An)other Gazes Back with Eight Eyes 
 
During Bartram’s description of his encounter with a “buff colour” spider “the size of a 
pigeons egg” readers see the spider speaking through gestures (lix). Like the bear cub, Bartram 
sees the spider as (an)other, who instead of being a mere object of his gaze possesses the power 
to look back at him and even defend himself if needed:  
As I was gathering specimens of flowers from the shrubs, I was greatly surprised 
at the sudden appearance of a remarkable large spider on a leaf, of the genus 
Araneus saliens, at the sight of me he boldly faced about, and raised himself up as 





Bartram respectfully acknowledges that the spider challenges him because he inadvertently 
invaded the spider’s space while collecting plant specimens; therefore, the narrator respects the 
spider and withdraws from close proximity. By turning around and facing Bartram, and by 
attempting to seem larger, the spider communicates his unease with the human animal who 
interrupted his hunt. In response the narrator attempts to put the spider at ease before further 
observation: “after I had recovered from the surprise, and observing the wary hunter had retired 
under cover, I drew near again, and presently discovered that I had surprised him on predatory 
attempts against the insect tribes” (lix). The visual image of Bartram and the spider mutually 
surprising and acknowledging one (an)other is a powerful testament to the effect that nonhuman 
animals can have on human animals and vice versa. After the spider’s successful 
communication, the narrator recounts the spider hunting a bumble bee: 
[T]his cunning intrepid hunter (conducted his subtil approaches, with the 
circumspection and perseverance of a Siminole, when hunting a deer) advancing 
with slow steps obliquely, or under the coverage of dense foliage, and behind the 
limbs, and when the bee was engaged in probing a flower he would leap nearer, 
and then instantly retire out of sight, under a leaf or behind a branch, at the same 
time keeping a sharp eye upon me. (lix)  
Acknowledging that the spider has the power to “keep an eye on him,” again demonstrates 
Bartram’s perception of himself as (an)other to the spider (lix). The spider asserts his agency, 
reacting to Bartram and demonstrating his semiotic communication with a knowing gaze. In 
moving away from the spider to respect his space, the narrator illustrates that the spider 





spider is only defined by his Linnaean name, “Arsneus saliens” (lviii). This name marks the 
spider as an object, a resource catalogued for later use by the new republic. After the spider 
gestures to signal displeasure, however, Bartram sees him as a speaking subject that he respects.  
The narrator imagines the spider as Native American instead of Euroamerican; Bartram 
himself admired and respected Native Americans and rejected the idea that “they were deserving 
of the severe censure, which prevailed against them among the white people” (lx). He proposed 
that the United States should only judge Native Americans on their civility in friendly cultural 
situations; liaisons should learn their language, customs, history, judicial system, religion, and 
traditions (lxi). The anthropomorphic Seminole-spider, who skillfully hunts his food using his 
natural surroundings, “under the cover of dense foliage and behind the limbs,” makes the hunters 
who “murder” the bear and her child-like cub with guns for skin and oil seem unskillful, 
disrespectful, and unnatural (lix). In this context, the narrator’s association of spider and 
Seminole emphasizes the narrator’s admiration for this nonhuman animal. Therefore, Bartram’s 
anthropomorphic description simultaneously elevates the spider and Native Americans, who 
would both be considered “uncivilized” according to dominant colonial ideology.  
Throughout this passage, the narrator explains interdependency in the vicinity of the 
spider. He describes how the flower feeds the bee, which feeds the spider, which he imagines 
“perhaps before night became himself, the delicious evening repast of a bird or lizard” (lix). For 
the narrator, all beings, from plant life to larger predators, depend upon one another for 
sustenance. The spider-Seminole-deer-hunter is a powerfully resonant image of the human and 
nonhuman connection. Instead of placing the human at the top of this food chain, he imagines a 





American), he places humans amidst this interdependent web of life, bringing them into a 
heterarchical, interspecies relationship where all are knotted together in reliance upon one 
another. The account of stumbling into a bush and pausing to meditate on the human animal 
connection to a random spider shows that even “humans” depend upon, and are connected to 
flowers, spiders, birds and lizards. 
 
Accepting the Responsibility of Killing 
 
When faced with a nonhuman animal with the power to kill him, the narrator acutely 
perceives that human animals cannot control nonhuman animals because they are subjects in 
their own right with their own agency to make choices. The narrator tells of Seminoles who 
evacuated their camp because of the presence of a large rattlesnake. They refused to kill the 
snake because of their “extraordinary veneration or dread of the rattle snake,” which led them to 
implore the narrator to kill the snake (164). Bartram kills the snake only after he “at length 
consented” for the sake of the “greatly disturbed” Native Americans (164-65). Before killing the 
snake, he carefully describes his peaceful behavior: “the dreaded and revered serpent leisurely 
traversed their camp, visiting the fire places from one to another, picking up fragments of their 
provisions and licking their platters” (165). The narrator makes it explicitly clear that he already 
respects the rattlesnake before he begins to hunt it. He made sure to kill the snake 
instantaneously with a blow to the head: he “luckily . . . dispatched him instantly,” showed his 
head “as a trophy of victory” to the Seminoles, and then stored his fangs with his specimens 
(165). Because Bartram says he kills the snake only to help the Seminoles, Bartram’s “victory” 





of Bartram’s skill. The narrator models for the reader that killing a snake is not a light decision. 
The subtext of the narrator’s actions says that one should spare nonhumans from suffering if 
killing is necessary, and accept responsibility for the killing—which Haraway claims in a 
necessary step to move towards a full recognition of our intertwinement with nonhumans and 
finding healthier ways to treat and relate to nonhumans (When Species Meet 88-90). 
 
In Praise of Rattlesnake Restraint 
 
Unlike the previous examples, this snake’s death in the Seminole camp fails to transform 
the narrator’s view of nonhuman animals. Instead, it acts as a prelude to a series of stories from 
the narrator’s past that taught him that rattlesnakes are subjects. He uses these stories to explain 
why he serves as “an advocate or vindicator of the benevolent and peaceable disposition of 
animal creation,” which includes rattlesnakes (168). He explains that the rattlesnake is “a 
wonderful creature, when we consider his form, nature and disposition” because “he is never 
known to strike until he is first assaulted or fears himself in danger, and even then always gives 
the earliest warning by the rattles at the extremity of his tail” (167). The narrator’s account of the 
rattlesnake death in the Seminole village leads to an argument for the entire species; the narrator 
vows to prevent future rattlesnake deaths at the hands of humans.  
He revisits a memory of how he and his friends walked by a rattlesnake several times in 
the woods at night. The animal had the power to kill the youths but instead chose not to bite them 
and merely observed them as they walked nearby. When young Bartram realized that the snake 
refrained from harming humans, his view of the rattlesnake shifted. He sees the rattlesnake’s 





or disturbed, but kept his half-shut eyes fixed on me” (169). This transforms his view of the 
rattlesnake. Bartram credits God and “the dignified nature of the generous though terrible 
creature, who had suffered us all to pass many times by him during the night, without injuring us 
in the least, although we must have touched him” (169). Recalling this incident enables Bartram 
to narrate a discussion where the youths reach a rational decision to allow the snake to live 
because they acknowledge it as a reasonable subject. This story models the rhetorical design of 
the other animal vignettes so far discussed: describing a moment when a nonhuman animal 
communicates to the narrator, which leads him to recognize the nonhuman animal’s subjectivity. 
This rattlesnake passage contains an additional message however; the snake could easily choose 
to kill human animals as the humans could choose to kill the snake. This destabilizes the 
human/animal hierarchy characteristic of Enlightenment thinking.  
Upon recalling a lesson from his father that snakes attack only if aggravated, and a third 
rattlesnake encounter from his youth, the narrator confessed that “fright” led him to kill the third 
snake that he encountered. He regretted this killing because the snake had the opportunity to bite 
him and chose not to: “I however, was sorry after killing the serpent when cooly recollecting 
every circumstance, he certainly had it in his power to kill me almost instantly, and I made no 
doubt that he was conscious of it” (170). In this instance Bartram failed to pause and assess the 
situation, which resulted in the snake’s death. He reacted on instinct, which Enlightenment 
science says separates “humans” from “animals.” After his fear subsided he recalls the event 
when the large rattlesnake is later served in several dishes for dinner. As with the crane example, 





most likely explains why Bartram “tasted of it but could not swallow it” (170). The distance 
from immediate danger also allows Bartram to regret and accept responsibility for snake’s death.  
By viewing the snake as (an)other once the danger passes he is able to see the events 
from the snake’s perspective and realizes that the rattlesnake “was conscious of” his power to 
kill (170). Ironically, the supposedly “mechanical” creature acted rationally while Bartram 
reacted with instinct. After recalling these memories, the narrator vows to readers that he will 
“never again be accessary to the death of a rattle snake, which promise [he has] invariably kept 
to” (170). These demonstrations of agency, the voluntary choices of all of the rattlesnakes he 
encountered to not harm him, deeply affect Bartram. The narrator advocates for no further harm 
to rattlesnakes with these stories, which show they are subjects capable of independent thought 
and action. 
 
The Alligator’s Choice 
 
Reading the vignettes of the bears, crane, spider, and rattlesnakes together establishes 
another way to interpret the widely anthologized alligator passage. Garnering a more complete 
understanding than simply reading the alligator’s death as “his most celebrated victory” allows a 
broader understanding of Bartram’s view of animals (Braund 35). The narrator experiences 
moments of transformation when the animals speak to him; he then sees them as subjects worth 
respecting and not deserving of death. The various animals’ subjectivity and agency expressed 
through their semiotic exchanges with Bartram speak of their reaction to the human presence of 





connection to the nonhuman world. The narrator shows that his respect for nonhumans follows 
recognition of nonhuman subjectivity and species interdependence.  
  But what happens when, unlike the rattlesnake, the animal decides he wants to fight with 
the narrator? In the widely anthologized alligator encounter, the narrator witnesses two large 
alligators battling in the water. They are depicted as supernatural monsters battling like dragons:  
Clouds of smoke issue from his dilated nostrils. The earth trembles with his 
thunder. When immediately from the opposite coast of the lagoon, emerges from 
the deep his rival champion. . . . Again they rise, their jaws clap together . . . when 
the contest ends . . . and the vanquished makes a hazardous escape . . . The shores 
and forests resound his dreadful roar, together with the triumphing shouts of the 
plaited tribes around, witnesses of the horrid combat. (75-76)  
In this vignette the narrator portrays the alligators in a mythic, dragon-like way, bypassing the 
usual objective observations. The tone of the passage reflects the narrator’s fear and admiration 
for the fighting amphibians. The alligators’ “clouds of smoke,” “dilated nostrils” and trembling 
earth seem reminiscent of the supernatural power of dragons battling. Alligators aurally disturb 
the forest with “thunder,” “dreadful roar[s],” and “triumphing shouts,” another otherworldly 
characterization. These descriptions indicate fear, awe, and respect for the power of the battling 
alligators. 
After witnessing this alligator battle, Bartram decides to fish before there are too many 
alligators present—a decision that results in a faceoff with a large alligator. He paddles his canoe 
from the shore of his camp towards a lagoon to catch trout and is “attacked on all sides, [by] 





their bodies above the water, roaring terribly and belching floods of water” (76). After clubbing 
the many alligators to fend them off of his canoe, the narrator succeeds in catching trout for his 
dinner. He is followed “particularly by an old daring one, about twelve feet in length, who kept 
close after [him], and when [he] stepped on shore and turned about, in order to draw up [his] 
canoe, he rushed up near [Bartram’s] feet and lay there for some time, looking [him] in the face, 
his head and shoulders out of water” (77). The narrator views the alligator’s nonverbal 
possession of the canoe as a territorial threat. In this moment, Bartram knows the alligator looks 
at him with intelligent eyes “looking at [him], and seeming neither fearful nor any way 
disturbed” as they acknowledge each other (77). As with the cub, spider, and rattlesnakes, the 
narrator knows that the alligator is a fellow subject with his own agency. 
In contrast to the rattlesnakes that let Bartram pass, the alligators attack Bartram, and the 
“old daring” twelve-foot long alligator pursues him onto land and challenges him for his fish. 
Here is where the nature-loving naturalist, who already had “good reason to dread the subtle 
attacks of the allegators” becomes “resolved [the alligator] should pay for his temerity” (75,77). 
He retrieves his gun from his camp, and returns to his canoe to find the alligator “with his foot on 
the gunwale of the boat, in search of fish” (77). Bartram’s other appeals for humans to leave 
bears, cranes, spiders, and rattlesnakes unmolested are absent when he kills the alligator by 
“lodging the contents of [his] gun in his head” (77). The alligator threatens the narrator’s life, 
and Bartram, realizing that the alligator has the power to kill him, must resort to using his gun. 
Similar to Bartram’s recognition of the cub’s, spider’s, and rattlesnakes’ ability to look at him 
with semiotic glances, Bartram sees that the alligator looks at him with the knowing eyes of a 





does not offer Bartram the restraint that the rattlesnake demonstrated. The alligator passage 
conveys perhaps the most important message of all of these vignettes: humans cannot control 
nonhuman subjects.  
The narrator’s strange and fantastic alligator encounter comes into focus as a reminder 
that nonhuman animals are subjects with their own agency. They may choose to control or kill 
human animals just as humans try to control and kill them. The killing of the alligator was not 
for sport, pleasure, or to win a victory over a powerful dragon-like warrior. Instead, recognizing 
that the alligator is a fellow rational creature, Bartram shoots him because the alligator chooses 
to threaten him.  
Perhaps this analysis sheds light on why the real-life Bartram was reluctant to discuss the 
alligator encounter after Travels was published. English Quaker Henry Wansey wrote in his 
diary that “when one of his companions made joking reference to the encounters with alligators 
described in the Travels, Bartram ‘became so reserved, that we could get but little conversation 
with him’” (qtd. in Slaughter 603). Perhaps, where the narrator fails to mourn the death of the 
alligator because he was afraid of the amphibian killing him, the real-life Bartram, upon 
reflection, sees the alligator’s death as a loss—a death that he accepts responsibility for and 
acknowledges the full weight of killing a fellow subject.  
In the vignettes explored in this thesis chapter, each nonhuman asserts its agency through 
various sounds, gestures, and actions that result in the narrator responding to them as fellow 
subjects. Their gestures, responses, and utterances are their expressions of agency that allow the 
narrator to view them as more than objects for scientific observation: the bear cub cries and 





from attacking humans, and the alligators perform territorial displays. Even the dead crane that 
the narrator encounters sparks memories of cranes communicating and living in complex, 
interdependent communities, which elicits the narrator’s regret and avocation for all cranes.  
The narrator states in the introduction that the philosophers of his time are incorrect to 
believe that animals act on mechanical impulses and are inferior to humans. He argues that 
animal potential for relationships and emotions equals that of humans: “The parental, and filial 
affections seem to be as ardent, their sensibility and attachment, as active and faithful, as those 
observed to be in human nature” (lvi-lvii). The excerpts examined in this thesis chapter, 
however, make an even larger case: that nonhumans act as subjects that communicate, express 
agency, and live interdependently with humans, and they deserve respect as fellow subjects 
because humans only imagine that they can control animals. Because the complex and 
multifaceted nature of nonhuman subjectivity continues to surprise Americans, the narrator’s 
encounters with animals remain relevant to us today; therefore, Travels, and other early 






CHAPTER FOUR: BEYOND THE OBJECTIFIED SPECTACLE IN THE 
TRAVEL DIARY OF ELIZABETH HOUSE TRIST 
  
 
Contextualizing Trist’s Diary 
 
The roads were so slippery that it made it very dangerous rideing. We concluded to go 
about two Mile out of the way to get over. Horses frosted, the cold so intense that I was 
allmost dead. We found it impossible to get to the next stage which is 20 miles. 
Therefore, hired a guide to conduct us to a good farm house, which was but 10 mile, 
where we were inform’d we cou’d be provided with beds . . . 
 
        Elizabeth House Trist (209) 
   
In the above excerpt dated January 7, 1784, Elizabeth House Trist records the dangerous 
conditions she faced while traveling through Hannas Town on horseback in what was then the 
colonial Western Frontier of Pennsylvania (209; Westmoreland County Historical Society). Trist 
and her horse overcame snow, ice, and mountainous terrain; shortly after writing this entry she 
rested in Pittsburgh, awaiting spring when she could resume her journey to Natchez via flatboat 
down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. The hope of joining her husband, who had moved to 
Natchez to manage land investments in British West Florida, motivated Trist during her rough 
journey (Kolodny, “Introduction” 184-90). Upon reaching her destination, Trist unfortunately 
discovered that her husband had died. Despite this tragic end to her journey, Trist kept the record 
of her travels, which was later preserved in archives at the University of Virginia library (194-
98). First published in 1990, scholars now know this text as The Travel Diary of Elizabeth House 
Trist: Philadelphia to Natchez, 1783-84. The Travel Diary is an eighteenth-century American 
secular journal, a semi-public document written in the style of an extended letter (Culley 16). 





Philadelphia (Kolodny, “Introduction” 186-87). In this thesis chapter, I focus on the overland 
entries in the diary and argue that, after one significant and prolonged journey, the narrator’s 
interactions with her horse promote an awareness of human animal and nonhuman animal 
kinship and a companion species relationship.  
Although animals were not the main focus of early American travel literature, Trist’s text 
includes many observations about them. Scholars speculate that Trist focused on nature because 
her primary audience, Jefferson, was interested in the landscape and resources of the early 
American frontier (Kolodny, “Introduction” 185-89). It is also likely, however, that Trist 
recorded her observations because she was genuinely interested in natural science. In a letter 
before her journey to Natchez, she expressed her wishes to accompany Jefferson on a naturalist 
frontier expedition (187). As a secular diarist, Trist acted as a community historian, capturing 
snapshots of Euroamerican frontier life and interactions with nonhuman animals (Culley 16).  
 
Discourses of Euroamerican Curiosity  
 
Despite the harsh weather and physical conditions of eighteenth-century travel, Trist used 
her journey to contribute to the colonial-American practice of observing and documenting 
natural “curiosities.” Susan Scott Parrish explains that while naturalist discourse of this era 
characterized nature as an asset, colonial Euroamericans also wrote about curious natural objects 
as a strategy for claiming a metropolitan identity: “Colonial men and women used novel or 
beautiful specimens of American nature to prove to themselves and to their metropolitan 
correspondents that they were not in an uncouth periphery and were not any less astute or curious 





naturalists were viewed as less legitimate than British naturalists until American men gained 
greater acceptance into this community (16-17). Contradictory beliefs that naturalist activities 
could be both “fatal” and “improving” to female naturalist practitioners failed to discourage them 
from adding their letters, reports, and drawings of American specimens to this transatlantic 
conversation (17). As the perceived credibility of American male naturalists increased with the 
formation of American philosophical associations and institutions, Parrish argues, participating 
in the discourse of “curiosity became more fraught for women” (17). Trist’s diary, written after 
this decline in female participation in the naturalist conversation, now stands as an invaluable 
artifact of an early British American woman’s relationship with the nonhuman world.  
Literary scholars such as Annette Kolodny and Susan Imbarrato note that Trist’s 
objectification of nature and the frontier entail describing the landscape and its inhabitants as 
captivating spectacles, assets for American development, and curious scientific objects. Kolodny 
explains that Trist looked forward to the development of the “wild” frontier into garden cities, 
and argues that, like other early American women, Trist saw beauty in raw nature only if it 
resembled a domestic garden (The Land Before Her 39-47). Imbarrato further explains that 
Trist’s first-person observations provide opportunities to see the early American landscape 
through a female settler’s eyes. For Imbarrato, Trist imagines herself as a landlady anticipating 
human improvement of the raw “wilderness” (69-76). Imbarrato elaborates on Kolodny’s theory 
that men’s attempts to master the frontier further separated them from the environment 
(Kolodny, The Lay of the Land 28). Imbarrato extends this idea to Trist’s observations of nature, 
which show that she and other settlers viewed the environment in relation to its ability to support 





greater environmental neglect to come” (74). Imbarrato focuses on Trist’s narration of men in a 
flatboat killing a pelican to inspect it as a curious object for scientific study (73-74). Imbarrato’s 
reading of Trist’s reaction as “curious excitement” mixed with “admiration” for the murdered 
pelican illustrates one aspect of early Americans’ relationship with animals; however, neither she 
nor Kolodny analyzes Trist’s descriptions of domestic frontier animals in the context of these 
encounters (Imbarrato 73). Imbarrato argues that Trist’s desire to catalogue the pelican as a 
curious object creates an ideological distance which results in her objectification of the bird (73-
74). Conversely, her physical closeness with her horse enables connection.  
 
Finding Similar Threads of Animal Subjectivity in Travels and The Travel Diary 
 
Before and during the American Revolution, William Bartram trekked through the 
southeastern British-American frontier and gathered the information he would later use to 
reconstruct his journey in his post-revolutionary published text Travels (Magee 123-24). Trist, 
however, penned her account during her arduous journey from Philadelphia to Natchez, shortly 
after the revolution (Kolodny, “Introduction” 184). While their journeys occurred at different 
times, both texts were written for post-revolutionary readers and, therefore, capture a similar 
moment in early Americans’ relationships with nonhuman animals in the frontier. At this time, 
early American naturalists viewed nonhuman nature as valuable resources that, when catalogued, 
could support the new American economy (Lewis 69). This view of nature relates to and 
succeeds what Parrish describes as British colonial discourse of nature as a collection of assets 
(17). Kathryn Napier Gray further explains that early American written accounts of the frontier 





contemporaneous political and ideological ambitions of colonial expansion and American 
independence” (530). Gray says descriptions of nature as a spectacle were an influential factor in 
shaping American political ideology that literally moved Euroamericans to dominate the natural 
frontier. Although Trist fails to discuss “wild” nonhumans as subjects, the text complicates 
written depictions of the natural world because the narration recognizes her horse as a subject.  
While Trist’s text reads as a less-conscious effort to explore acknowledgement of animal 
subjectivity than Travels does, animal subjectivity still appears in Trist’s diary. While sustained 
contact with nonhuman frontier inhabitants changes the narrator’s relationship with them in 
Bartram’s Travels, the cold weather and fast pace of Trist’s journey prevented her from making 
extended observations of “wild” animals. The harsh weather instead created a situation for Trist 
to experience prolonged contact and develop a close bond with her horse. A comparison of 
scenes involving unusual birds in Bartram’s and Trist’s texts illustrates my point that close and 
prolonged contact between humans and nonhumans is vital before the naturalist observer may 
move from objectifying discourse and begin to view animals as subjects. In the case of the 
pelican that Imbarrato says Trist objectifies, Trist only briefly observes live pelicans. The first 
pelican she comes close to is killed by a man on the flatboat: “There are many Pelican about 
here, the first we have seen. They are a fine Majestick looking bird and at a distance resemble the 
swan. One of our people kill’d one and brought it on board the boat” (229). As Trist recounts the 
close observations of the dead pelican, she makes objective scientific notes but she also tries to 
understand how the pelican used its pouch. By contrast, Bartram studied cranes before 
confronting a dead one; his previous knowledge allows him to recall how cranes live in 





observing them brings him joy and gives him knowledge to work as a naturalist. Because Trist 
has no experience observing live pelicans closely, she can only speculate about how dead 
pelicans behave and sees no connection with the bird, which she describes in the language of 
curiosity:  
They are all white, except the wings which are tinged with black. It measured ten 
feet from the tip end of one wing to the other. The Bill is about an inch wide and a 
foot in length. . . . I can not comprehend what use they make of this amazing 
pouch, unless to scoop up the little fish. They are very harmless and so tame that 
they swim allmost in reach of our oars. The most curious bird I ever saw. (229) 
Even though she makes scientific observations about the dead pelican, her curiosity comes from 
her desire to better comprehend them as living beings. Unlike the narrator in Travels who sees 
even a dead sandhill crane as a subject, Trist had never encountered pelicans before this moment. 
To her the pelican was sexless, an “it;” whereas Bartram saw the crane he encountered as “he.” 
Trist’s physical distance from live pelicans prevents her from bridging the ideological gap; 
therefore, Trist is unable to understand pelicans as subjects and can only speak of them with the 
language of curiosity. Trist’s depictions of her brief contact with frontier animals portray them as 
distant curious objects; however, after prolonged contact with her horse her language about him 
gradually recognizes the horse’s subjectivity.  
 
Understanding Her Traveling Companion  
 
In 1704, as Sarah Kemble Knight departed from Boston along rural roads to New Haven, 





on a Gate post” (Knight 87). Although this image presents a comical view of a larger man on a 
horse most likely meant to entertain Knight’s audience, it also shows a human and horse merged 
into one entity working together, the post supporting the globe. Here the man is intimately 
connected to and dependent upon his horse.
13
 Similarly, written nearly eighty years later, Trist 
uses written expression to acknowledge a similar physical and mental connection with her horse.  
 Trist’s entries about her horse gradually shift from objectifying descriptions to those that 
enable the horse’s agency to emerge. This depiction of the horse as an agent correlates with 
discursive traits described by Donna J. Haraway as a companion species relationship. Haraway 
explains that companion species bonds can occur wherever nonhuman animal and human animal 
lives and bodies intersect, influence, and create each other (When Species Meet 16-17). A 
“companion” relationship, as Haraway defines it, goes beyond pet/owner and recognizes all of 
the ways that human and nonhuman bodies and minds intertwine to make us human animals. For 
example, Haraway argues that this relationship is reciprocal because humans also shape and 
influence nonhumans. A companion species relationship entails recognition of other species as 
kin; this recognition must be present before interspecies respect is possible:  
Looking back in this way takes us to seeing again, to respecere, to the act of 
respect. To hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay 
attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem: all of that is tied to polite 
greeting, to constituting the polis, where and when species meet. (19)  
Haraway stresses that acknowledging this intermeshed relationship and participating in 
interspecies response fosters respect. The respect that evolves out of this expanded view of 
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human and nonhuman relationships brings the threads of interconnection into focus: “To knot 
companion and species together in encounter, in regard and respect, is to enter the world of 
becoming with, where who and what are is precisely what is at stake” (19). That is, a companion 
species relationship involves “becoming with” nonhumans—defining who you are and what you 
are in a manner that acknowledges and accepts all of the ways nonhumans influence us, make us 
possible, and exist as kin. Haraway writes that human and nonhuman relationships constantly 
evolve; during the months that Trist was with her horse, their relationship certainly deepened. 
Trist’s diary narrates an early instance of the movement towards a contemporary companion 
species relationship.  
This theoretical angle brings to light where Trist’s narration departs from the dominant 
colonial view of domestic animals and verges on escaping dominant ideology by recognizing 
how her identity is intermeshed with her horse. When viewing Trist’s narration of her 
relationship with her horse through Haraway’s definition of companion species, we see a 
silhouette of a city woman on her horse, an image of interdependence as physical and mental 
connection, a state of “becoming with.” Haraway elaborates that: “Species interdependence is the 
name of the wording game on earth, and that game must be one of response and respect. That is 
the play of companion species learning to pay attention. . . . I am who I become with companion 
species, who and which make a mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind” (19). As 
Trist’s journey progresses, she pays more attention to her horse in diary entries and demonstrates 
an increased awareness of this interspecies connection.  
As Virginia DeJohn Anderson points out, early Euroamerican farmers were more likely 





According to DeJohn Anderson, historical records such as sermons show that seventeenth 
century Euroamericans viewed domestic livestock as living possessions that they were 
responsible for controlling: 
By emphasizing that livestock were living creatures, not just tools to be used and 
discarded, this way of thinking also left room for farmers to develop affection 
toward the animals entrusted to their care. But by assigning livestock a status 
approaching that of servants or even children, as beings to be ruled with a kind 
but steady hand, the concept of stewardship muddled the theoretically distinct 
categories of human and animal. (93)  
In the context of DeJohn Anderson’s theory—that the dominant ideological boundaries that 
proclaimed humans and animals as separate beings were less defined between humans and 
laboring domestic animals in the seventeenth century—it makes sense, then, that Trist more 
readily bonds with her horse than with the “wild” animals she encounters.  
 
Moving Towards Recognition of Intertwinement, Response, and Respect 
 
In the second preserved entry of The Travel Diary, written December 24, 1783, Trist 
mentions her traveling party’s horses in a procedural manner that portrays horses as primarily a 
means of transportation: “Arose very early with an intention to set off before Breakfast, but it set 
in snow very fast which detained us till 10 O’ clock; we rode some distance before we baited 
[fed] our Horses, the roads beyond description bad: we cou’d get no further that day than 
Elizabeth Town” (201). In this entry, Trist links the group’s ability to travel with their horses’ 





on a road trip. At this point Trist’s expresses recognition of her horse’s agency, and her ability to 
respond to those expressions of agency is limited. Trist’s tone and detail merely acknowledge 
that humans are linked to their horses in order to maintain their identities as travelers, a rather 
shallow connection when compared to a companion species relationship, which involves 
acknowledging the many complex ways that humans and nonhumans are connected, respond to 
each other, and enable each other’s identities. Haraway contends that this failure to recognize 
interspecies intertwinement makes it difficult for humans to respond to, respect, and 
acknowledge nonhumans as kin (When Species Meet 19). Because of the manner in which the 
diary begins, Trist’s eventual recognition of the deeper ways that her horse enables her identity 
marks a significant move towards a companion species relationship.  
Trist’s movement towards recognition of interdependence first occurs five days into her 
journey in the December 30, 1783 entry. Despite her desire to continue and find nicer lodgings, 
she acknowledges that her traveling schedule depends on her horse’s physical wellness. Even 
though her party disapproves of the accommodations available, they are forced to stop to feed 
and rest the horses: “we were obliged to push on for want of a place to stop that was fit for a 
christian. At one House we stayed to feed our horses, the family was large—a good farm and a 
Mill, the buildings good; but every thing was so dirty that I would rather have slept out of doors” 
(204). Although Trist disapproves of the lodging, she sees that her horse is hungry and tired. 
While her record of feeding the horse implies that she sees him as a vehicle for travel, she also 
sees that at least in one respect they depend upon each other. The conditions undesirable to 





The presentation of horses and humans as interdependent species is not limited to Trist 
and her horse. During a stop in one recently settled frontier location Trist’s elderly hostess, who 
was “upwards of eighty,” brags that “she coul’d ride a 100 miles in one day without being 
fatigued if she cou’d get a horse that wou’d carry so far” (204). The woman’s ability to skillfully 
connect with her horse is narrated as a mark of pride on a frontier where riding long distances 
was necessary. This woman describes her horsemanship, in effect constructing her identity in 
relation to a horse. Trist finds this woman’s ability to travel great distances on a horse significant 
enough to record in her diary. Perhaps this anecdote was included because Trist related to the 
woman’s experience with her horse; she too imagined constructing her identity as a companion 
to a horse.  
As the freezing conditions on the trail worsen, Trist evinces an even greater connection to 
her traveling companion. She knows that he enables her survival in these harsh conditions and 
records how he carried her through waist-high snow that nearly blocked the only path up a 
mountain: “the Snow up to the Horses bellies. . . . Had I dismounted, I believe I must have 
Perished for I cou’d not have mounted again” (204-05). Here, Trist’s identity as a human traveler 
relies upon her horse. She explains how the horse enabled her survival: “I am certain I cou’d not 
have walk’d 2 or 3 miles through the snow” (205). During the trek up the snow-covered 
mountain she also remarks that she has to hold onto the horse’s mane so that she does not fall out 
of her saddle during a steep incline: the terrain is “allmost perpendicular, and our saddles slip’d 
so that we cou’d scarcely keep our selves on by holding the main” (205). Close contact with her 
horse is essential to her survival. The image of Trist, fingers entwined in the horse’s mane and 





travel. Instead of a human rider perched atop a horse, this passage features a different 
silhouette—one with the rider’s body pressed close to the horse—both species working together 
for survival. Trist’s decision to describe her horse’s presence as life-saving marks a shift from 
understanding the horse as a means of transportation to recognizing her dependence upon him for 
survival. The rough traveling conditions deepen Trist’s relationship with her horse and her 
account of him as a respected companion. 
Trist gradually sees the horse as part of her own physical ability and identity. After weeks 
of traveling with him, she mentions that she senses his emotions. Her sensitivity signals the 
presence of another key aspect of a companion species relationship—listening to and responding 
to other species with respect. An excerpt from January 8, 1784 stands out for Trist’s increased 
sensitivity and response to her horse’s needs and nonverbal communication. On January 6, 1784, 
Trist attributes her composed demeanor during the difficult travel conditions to her riding skills: 
“The small runs as well as creeks were all most impassible. The Horses were frequently near 
swimming. Notwithstanding, I did not feel much intimidated but plunged through with no other 
mishap than getting wet; the roads very bad. . . . Mr. Fowler gave me credit for my good 
Horsemanship” (208). Two days later, however, Trist senses her horse’s fear and responds 
empathetically with concern for both horse and rider:  
I cou’d not get my Horse out of a walk, and every step his feet allmost sliping 
from under him, at last down we came; but lucky enough to receive no damage. 
Only it made his cowardice increase and added nothing to my courage. Poor 
beast, he trembled every step he took after that. Night came on and, for the first 





The difference between the two situations is that in the January 8 excerpt Trist senses that her 
horse is scared. While in the first entry Trist’s confidence is bolstered by her increased skill, her 
sensitivity to her horse in the second entry illustrates her evolving connection with him during 
the hazardous journey. Trist and her horse are so intimately connected that she loses courage 
only when her horse becomes fearful: “his cowardice increase[d] and added nothing to my 
courage” (210). Trist reads her horse’s nonverbal communication, his shaking, as fear. After her 
horse falls, she senses his trembling and feels sorry for him, lamenting that he is a “Poor beast” 
(210). Calling her horse a “Poor beast” may initially seem an uncompassionate expression to a 
modern reader. In the context of Trist’s greater connection with her horse and ability to sense his 
emotions, however, this phrase indicates an empathetic response. This comparison of these two 
passages, therefore, shows another advance in Trist’s evolving relationship with her horse—
movement towards a companion species bond with her horse.  
 
Comparing Companion Intimacy: the Horse, Fawnis, and Polly 
 
The significance of Trist’s frequent diary entries about her horse and their increasing 
bond comes into full view when compared to how she describes her female traveling companion 
Polly and her small dog Fawnis. While Trist never names her steed outright, she still comes to 
write about him as a companion to whom her identity and emotions are linked. She writes about 
her dependence upon him; she understands his nonverbal utterances enough to read his emotions. 
Because of these connections, a relationship with compassion and respect becomes possible by 
the end of the journey. At a first reading, Trist’s horse might appear as an absent figure, hidden 





lens of a companion species relationship makes Trist’s greater bond with him visible. This bond 
also results in an increase in the horse’s ability to express himself and break through Trist’s 
narration. Specifically, the moment of connection that allows readers to hear the horse as a 
character is the aforementioned passage when Trist describes her horse’s fall and resulting fear 
on the frozen trail: “Only it made his cowardice increase and added nothing to my courage. Poor 
beast, he trembled every step he took after that” (210). In addition to Trist’s expression of 
connection, in this moment Trist also narrates the horse’s feelings and experiences during this 
leg of the journey, bringing him into focus as more than an element of scenery. The horse’s fear 
makes visible his own needs and emotions.  
The emotional needs and state of Fawnis and Polly, however, cannot be deciphered from 
Trist’s encounters with them. Trist mentions Fawnis only to mark his mysterious disappearance 
during a stop to rest from traveling on a flatboat down the Yasow river: “We stopped at an Island 
for the night, and I lost my poor little Dog, Fawnis. Tis supposed the Allegator got him as one 
was seen swimming about the boat in the evening—poor little fellow” (230). Kolodny speculates 
in a footnote that Trist most likely acquired her dog during a stop as a gift (230). While Trist 
does express sadness for the loss of her “poor little fellow,” she never describes him as part of 
her identity, never records sensing his emotions, nor writes about him in any other surviving 
entry. As animal companions go, Trist’s descriptions of her horse indicate a growing 
relationship, while this lone excerpt about her dog merely records his disappearance and Trist’s 
sadness at his fate.  
Trist similarly neglects to mention her human companion—a young girl named Polly, 





expressly emotional capacity in her diary. Scholars have yet to decode Polly’s relationship to 
Trist; was she a servant, a neighbor, a distant relative? Kolodny describes her as “a female 
companion known only as Polly” (“Introduction” 188). Trist mentions Polly mostly as a woman 
to share a bed with on their journey; in this capacity Polly helps Trist to maintain a public display 
of virtue. Without Polly, this journey would have been a compromising situation for a lone 
woman traveling the eighteenth-century British-American frontier. On January 1, 1784, Trist 
describes the lodging conditions when they stop for the night in Juniata, Pennsylvania: “The one 
[bed] occupied by Polly and my self was up in a dark corner surrounded by pickling tubs which 
did not yield the most agreeable smell in the world; the other by Mr. Fowler and a Lawyer 
Hamilton” (205). In this entry, Trist makes it clear that she and Polly slept together while the 
men they were traveling with slept in another bed, their privacy secured by pickling tubs. Six 
days later, Trist mentions Polly again when they stop at a farm for the night. Again, Polly’s 
presence establishes Trist’s propriety—they sleep in one room with “Six or 7 men” (209). The 
entry records Polly’s spot beside Trist and their joint efforts to change clothes behind a curtain: 
“Old Mr. Waltowers and Mr. Irwin had one of the beds, Polly and myself the other—but we 
found no difficulty in being private, having good worsted curtains round the bed. We allways 
made it practise to dress and undress behind the curtain” (209). Polly receives no further mention 
until May 27, 1784, when they share an “old log hut” and “spread [their] beds at night and, in the 
Morning by rolling them up, they serve as seats” (218). Trist makes it clear that she and Polly 
sleep away from male travelers and even relates how they domesticate the hut by using beds as 





When the traveling party encounters rough conditions the next day, Trist mentions Polly 
only to note Polly’s horse’s emotional state: “Polly’s Horse being in better Spirits than mine, she 
push’d on” (210). Interestingly, Trist records the horse’s good emotional state but fails to explain 
if Polly was bothered by the icy weather, although she does note when Polly comes down with a 
fever. Each of these examples show that Polly helps Trist to maintain propriety along the 
“uncivilized” frontier and that Polly garners less mention in the diary than Trist’s horse. Trist’s 
relationships with Polly and Fawnis fail to evolve in the journal as her relationship with her horse 
does, suggesting that she considers the growing companion bond with her horse remarkable and 
worth sharing with fellow naturalist Jefferson. This ecofeminist/human-animal studies approach, 
therefore, allows The Travel Diary to be read, in part, as Trist’s account of her growing 










A Spectrum of Human and Nonhuman Relations 
 
This project reveals that Fabulous Histories, Travels, and The Travel Diary present 
narratives that resist objectifying animals. None of these texts wholly endorse the human/animal 
hierarchy, nor do they completely break from it. The best way to visualize this relationship is by 
arranging the texts along a spectrum as in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Human and Nonhuman Relations 
Texts at the left extreme of this spectrum, without exception, endorse the human/animal binary 
and hierarchical relationships, such as those promoted by hierarchies in Enlightenment thought. 
Texts at the extreme right of the spectrum feature heterarchical relationships (such as Haraway’s 





necessary for survival, and nonhumans are treated with respect. Any movement to the right along 
this spectrum is also movement toward more sustainable human and nonhuman relationships.  
In the context of the spectrum in Figure 1, Fabulous Histories advocates for compassion 
towards animals and speaks against keeping nonhumans in cages for amusement or as preserved 
curiosities. These qualities keep Fabulous Histories from the extreme left end of the spectrum, 
despite its constant statements that animals are inferior beings. Travels is placed further to the 
right because the narrator repeatedly moves from a scientific, objectifying tone towards “wild” 
nonhumans to seeing them as communicative beings who express agency. The Travel Diary 
features Trist’s gradual movement toward a companion species bond with her horse. This text is 
to the right of Travels because Trist acknowledges a bodily and emotional connection with her 
horse that allows her to read his emotions—she sees how their interdependence shapes and 
enables progress and survival during their arduous journey. That being said, Bartram, does 
reflect on how cranes bring him joy and partly enable his work as a naturalist. Trist’s bond with 
her horse, however, is one of two creatures working together for survival. While Trist does sense 
her horse’s emotions at the end of her diary, Bartram sees various frontier animals as speaking 
subjects. An argument could therefore be made to switch the placement of Trist’s and Bartram’s 
texts along the spectrum for different reasons. Both texts, however, still make more progress 
towards sustainable relationships with nonhumans than Fabulous Histories.  
My thesis opens the door to further examine the connections among human relationships 
with animals in early America and the discourses of sympathy, understanding, science, nature, 
and respect. Advocacy and compassion for animals may only advance a relationship to a certain 





species exist interdependently and justify overlooking the abuse of nonhumans by claiming they 
are less-than-human. Acknowledging nonhuman subjectivity, therefore, acts as a threshold that 
must be crossed to advance beyond a relationship in which nonhumans are inferior beings that 
should be cared for because humans, as a superior species, are responsible for them. In early 
America, as in contemporary America, examples of nonhuman communication, emotions, 
interspecies dependence, and agency continue to shock humans. Similar explorations of early 
American texts would therefore prove productive because they reveal something about the 
origins of our contemporary denial of nonhuman subjectivity.  
 
The Nineteenth Century Brings More Vocal Animal Advocacy  
 
Sentimentality, kindness and avocation for the welfare of animals persisted as minority 
discourses in the United States. In 1866, for example, people questioned the establishment of 
The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In various magazine articles writers 
accused the organization and its president of unnecessary sentimentality towards animals. New 
York enacted several state laws that outlined rules for transporting livestock by railroad, 
outlawed fighting animals with each other or humans, and made it a misdemeanor to harm or 
neglect any animal belonging to a human (“Cruelty to Animals”). While these laws set 
protections in place for animals, including “any horse, mule, ox, cattle, sheep, or other animal, 
belonging to [a human],” they failed to protect nondomestic animals (“Cruelty to Animals”). 
Also, the SPCA faced challenges from the media and individual Americans. In a letter to the 
editor of The Galaxy, on June, 15 1866, the president of the SPCA, Henry Bergh, addressed the 





[Y]ou are pleased to say, that this Society is the least needed of all reforms. You 
will pardon me for saying that I think the article alluded to was written without 
due reflection. Is no reform needed in the carrying of cattle by railroads thousands 
of miles, without allowing them rest, or food, or water for four and five days at a 
time? (“Article 3” 365) 
The Galaxy editor replies that he approves of the reforms but disapproves of the creation of a 
society to oversee them. The editor points out Bergh’s sympathy for animals and says that The 
Galaxy employees privately empathize: “As to the cattle, the beeves and calves, sheep and 
lambs, and the unnecessary and injurious suffering that they undergo at the hands of butchers and 
drovers, Mr. Bergh’s sensibilities, official though they are, cannot be more tender, more easily 
wounded than those of our humble and private self” (365). The editor’s tone seems sarcastic 
even as he says he possesses tender sensibilities.  
Whether this editor’s response was a direct attack on Bergh because he sympathizes with 
animals or not, an article from November 3, 1866, titled “Another Anti-cruelty Society Needed” 
directly attacks the society’s sympathy for animals: “the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty is 
appealing to public sympathy in behalf of the animals. In fact, there is every certainty that no 
effort will be made to imbue them with a proper sense of gratitude” (220). This satire of the 
SPCA continues with descriptions of mewling cats disrupting human sleep, ants and roaches 
ruining pastries, and moths destroying clothes; it concludes by calling for a society where 
animals advocate for other animals to be kind to humans, “a zoologico-benevolent society, which 
should educate and send forth missionary bugs and beasts of every species for the conversion of 





among Animals of Cruelty to Men” (220). Clearly animal welfare existed as a contested subject 
in the nineteenth century; at least the presence of the SPCA indicates a more direct and vocal 
avocation than in Trimmer’s, Bartram’s and Trist’s eighteenth-century texts. While post-bellum, 
nineteenth-century antisentimental thought partly influenced the negative reception of the SPCA, 
the eighteenth-century discourse of sympathy played a role in how humans related to and 
advocated for nonhumans. As sympathy was significant during and immediately after the 
American Revolution, examining its impact on human and nonhuman relations adds another 
significant dimension to the reading of these texts. One direction for future research is to layer 
the discourse of sympathy onto a human-animal/ecofeminist framework to decode human and 
nonhuman interactions in Trist’s, Bartram’s, Trimmer’s, and other early American texts.  
 
Connecting with Nonhuman Subjects in Contemporary America  
 
Scholars across many fields have begun to unravel the myth of human superiority and 
separation from animals, including Carol J. Adams, Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Cary 
Wolfe). As Murphy explains, all living beings are interdependent and interanimated—growing 
together and learning from each other (Literature, Nature, and Other 21-23). Therefore, even the 
smallest waves of influence can impact all other beings because we exist in these interdependent 
relationships. Too often, contemporary American relationships with nonhumans exist to the left 
of the “acknowledging subjectivity” threshold (see Figure 1). Reimagining ways for humans to 
acknowledge humanimality is a challenging project with infinite possibilities that I hope many 





the better. For now, this small disturbance is a ripple in what I hope will be a wave of rethinking 
early American texts with ecocritical and human-animal studies lenses.  
Where can we look for vital moments of connection such as those Trist and Bartram 
recount? We spend our lives connected via multimedia devices and disconnected from 
nonhuman nature. Immersed in a digital world of noise, images, and human-centric ideas, these 
simulacra separate us from the physical world where we encounter and bond with animals. The 
further we remove ourselves physically and mentally from our nonhuman kin, the easier it 
becomes to forget that we share this connection and that human decisions based on “the good of 
humanity” can harm all beings.  
For Bartram and Trist, animal bonding happened “out” in nature; Trimmer discussed the 
pleasures of observing animals in nature as opposed to collecting and caging them. But what if 
nature is not “out there” but everywhere? Each daily encounter is a moment to rekindle our 
connection to nonhuman kin. Perhaps it is as simple as observing a spider spin her web in the 
morning light of your kitchen windowsill and imagining how she sees the world. The spider does 
not see herself as an invader, as less-than-human, or as a pest. She moves about the world with 
her own thoughts, emotions, and purpose—all of which are always already intimately connected 
to our own movement through the world. The sooner all human animals envision their 
connection to nonhumans the sooner the quality of all life will improve. These connections 
cannot be made, however, unless human animals take the effort to encounter, listen to, respect 
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